HAROLD B. LEE LIBRARY

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JvsTiN McCarthy Richard Henry5toddard Arthvr Richmond Mar5H. A.B. Pavlvan Dyke.D.D. Albert Ellery Bergh

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Courtesy of the Ijlew York Historical Society, New York City

JAMES MADISON Portrait by Asher B. Durand

ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

Photograinrc from the original miniature hv ArMhald Robertson.

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i

THE FEDERALIST

A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JOHN JAY

AND

JAMES MADISON

INTERPREIING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AS AGREED UPON BY THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, SEPTEMBER 1 7, 1 78?

WITH A SPECIAL INTRODUCTION BY GOLDWIN SMITH, D.C.L.

FORMERLY REGIUS PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY, OXFORD UNIVERSITY; EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH AND CON- STITUTIONAL HISTORY, CORNELL UNIVERSITY

REVISED EDITION

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ERiGHMl YOUNG uNtv'P1?mT ^ PROVO, UTAH

SPECIAL INTRODUCTION

1^

^ I ^HE FEDERALIST was written to commend to the ac- I ceptance of the people of the Thirteen Colonies the con- stitution tendered them by the Federal Convention. The cardinal principles of that constitution it sets forth, advocates, and defends against objections. Though occasional and con- troversial, it treats its subject with a philosophic breadth and a general insight into political character which have made it a political classic. No constitution, according to Chancellor Kent, ever received a more masterly and successful vin- dication.

I Of the three authors, Alexander Hamilton, the soul of the work, the writer of sixty-three of the eighty-five numbers, and the joint author with Madison of three others, was so friendly to strong government and so much an admirer of Brit- ish institjjtions as to be suspected of monarchical designs! He avowed his ad^miration not only of the British rnonarchy, but of the jjouse of Lords] A native, not of America, but of the West Indies, he had thrown himself into the American Revo- lution perhaps as much under the influence of youthful ambi- tion as from settled conviction in favour of popular government. He was henceforth leader of the Federal, which may be called the centripetal, party in American politics, in opposition to the Republican, or centrifugal, party, the leader of which was J^f- fersori. As a member of the Convention, he had proposed a constitution more conservative than that which was adopted; but upon the rejection of his plan had heartily embraced the work of the Convention.

« Jay, who, being sick, was only able to contribute five num- bers, was also a strong conservative, and afterwards, as Ambas- sador to England, made a treaty which brought on a democratic stormj

iii

iv SPECIAL INTRODUCTION

» Madison, the sole author of fourteen numbers and the part author of three others, had taken an important share in the framing of the Constitution. He belonged at this time to the same party as Hamilton, though he afterwards passed over to Jefferson and the democracy. Jefferson, however, approved in the main of the Constitutionj

The crisis was most serious, the Colonies having been left at the conclusion of the war in a state of anarchy, distraction, and financial repudiation. Rebellion amounting almost to civil war had broken out. Congress had sunk into impotence and coMempt.

fThe writers of The Federalist fell in with the belief that the fwork of the Convention was the first attempt to frame a con- stitution on rational principles. " It has been frequently re- marked," they say, '' that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country to decide by their conduct and ex- ample the important question whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice ; or whether they are forever destined to depend for i their political constitutions on accident and force. "l This is not strictly in accordance with fact. Besides the 'constitutions framed by lawgivers such as Solon and Zaleucus for the little States of Greece, and the constitutions^ mostly ephemeral, framed for Italian republics, there was the Instrument of Gov- ernment, the outcome of the political ferment and speculation of the English Revolution. But this had been buried out of sight and notice under the ruins of a lost cause.

Four courses presented themselves : —

I. Independent sovereignty of all the States. Of this, there seem to have been a few advocates among extreme politicians of the centrifugal type.

II. Division of the States into groups, which it was supposed would be politically more manageable than a union of them all. The only valid argument in favour of this plan, that is to say, the antagonism between the free and slave States, had not as yet presented itself in force, no cotton-gin having yet been in- vented, while the abolition of slavery was expected in the near future.

HI. A true federation, each State retaining its sovereignty, and the Federal Government dealing, not with persons, but with

SPECIAL INTRODUCTION v

the States, having no power of legislation proper, no power of taxation, but only of requisition, no means of enforcing its decrees and requisitions in the last resort other than that of dis- training on the defaulting State by federal force.

IV. A nation with a federal structure, in which the States continue to exist with! their general rights, but the Federal Gov- ernment has defined powers of legislation and taxation, and in execution of those powers deals^ not with the States only, but with persons, and, in case of resistance, through courts of law. This was the form of settlement embraced by the Convention, *-x ^^^'^-^^ and advocated by The Federalist.

The Convention and the authors of The Federalist had be- fore them as examples of federal government in ancient times the Lycian Confederation, which, from the account given of it by Strabo, appears to have been well organized, but of the his- tory of which little is known ; and the Achaean League, the main objects of which were military and diplomatic, its Chief be- ^yrfy*^'' ing the General (Strategos), and its next officer the Com- mander of the Horse, while its General Assembly was primary, not representative, representative government having been un- known to the ancients. In modern times, they had the Swiss Confederation, which, however, at that date, was little more than a league of its members for mutual defence against formidable neighbours, or for maintenance of internal peace, with domes- tic institutions and relations very far from the republican ideal ; and the United Netherlands, a defensive league perpetuated as a Federal State, but too ill-compacted and too clumsy in its operation to serve as a useful model. From the examples of dominant States with dependencies, such as the Venetian Em- pire, or of a union of principalities, such as the German Empire, there was, of course, nothing to be learned. The strongest light was that afforded to the colonists by the experience of po^i their own Revolutionary Congress, the defects of which were ^' ev/' ' glaring even during the war, and since the war had become more glaring still.

The political quarry from which materials for the national part of this political edifice were really hewn was the British Constitution, with its Colonial reproductions. Hence were derived the single head of the State, with his veto on legislation, his treaty power, and his command of the army ; the bicameral ^

vi SPECIAL INTRODUCTION

legislature with a conservative Upper House; the exclusive origination of money Bills in the popular House ; the Bill of Rights; the safeguards, analagous to the British Place Bill, against the influence of patronage ; and the general machinery of Parliamentary government. The main difference was the ^'^ substitution, in the case of the headship of the State and the

Upper House, of the elective for the hereditary principle. With a part of this political machinery the people of the several States had already been made familiar by the working of their colonial institutions.

Montesquieu in those days was the great authority. His doctrine that the separation of the executive^ legislative, and judicial powers from each other was essential to liberty was regarded as incontrovertible and fundamental. If, as appears, what Montesquieu meant was only that the distinction of those powers was most important, he was right. If he meant more, he was not right, for supreme power will centre some- where, and does in fact centre in the legislative body. He would have been doubly wrong, had he founded such a theory on the working constitution of Great Britain. For the British King had by that time lost his executive power, it having passed to a Ministry, which in fact was a committee of Parliament, dependent for continuance in office on that assembly ; while the judges were appointed by the Ministry, and were liable to re- moval by a vote of the two Houses.

The authors of The Federalist, at all events, did not adopt the extreme version of Montesquieu's doctrine. They upheld the President's veto on legislation and the participation of the Senate in the treaty power. On the other hand, they carried to an extreme the ^principles of the Place Bill, excluding the Ministers of State from the two Houses of the legislature, which are thus left without the organization and guidance im- parted by the presence of Ministers to the British Parliament. There is nothing in their essays to show that this point attracted their attention, or that they foresaw the results of their decision, momentous as those results have proved.

Nor, in spite of the warning example of Great Britain, did they anticipate the existence of national parties, or of the sys- tem of party government which has now obtained legal recogni- tion, and has to a great extent practically overlaid the American

SPECIAL INTRODUCTION vii

Constitution. On this point they were as Uttle prescient as Washington, who looked on party as a transient disease to be cured by bringing the leaders of the two factions together in the same government. Hence their confidence in the machinery of special Boards for the election of the President, which the prev- alence of national parties has reduced to mere transmitters of a party vote. Hence their belief that the State would always predominate over the nation in popular interest and attach- ment, the reverse of which has turned out to be the case, the State elections being to a large extent governed by the national parties.

They distinguish between a Democracy and a Republic. By Democracy they mean a polity in which the people legislate and govern in their own persons, as they did at Athens, Rome, and Florence. By a Republic they mean a polity in which the peo- ple legislate and govern through their elected representatives. It is, however, pretty clear that one of them at least desired and expected their Republic not to be democratic in the common sense of the term, but to be the rule of those who were fit to rule — the landholders, merchants, lawyers, and other men of the upper and highly educated class.

The combination of the State element with the national ele- ment in the Constitution was dictated to the Fathers by circum- stance ; still it is the most original part of their work, and the exposition of it is perhaps the best part of these essays. Its most questionable feature is the irrevocable concession to the small States of an equality of representation with the great States in the Senate, whereby the legislative character of that body is sacrificed to its function as the guardian of a compact. For this anomaly, the serious character of which is likely to be more felt hereafter if the Senate continues to increase its power, there can only be pleaded in defence of the framers and apologists of the constitution the manifest necessity of the time.

By Madison was undertaken, not, we may surmise, without a qualm, the treatment of the critical question whether the sev- eral States, after entering the federal compact, would retain the right of secession. His judgment, delivered with studied am- biguity, seems to be that they would have the right, but that, if any State attempted to exercise it, good reasons for coercion

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viii SPECIAL INTRODUCTION

might be found. The influence which the admission of new States, virtually on a national basis, would have on the decision of the question would hardly present itself to his mind. It was obvious that no central State could secede without breaking up the whole Union, and thus calling the law of self-preserva- tion into play. The obscurity of Madison's language, how- ever, is extreme.

The defence of the compromise on the slavery question, giv- ing the Southern whites votes for three-fifths of the slaves, will hardly be deemed strong. It rests on the ambiguous character of the negro, who was at once a person and a thing ; potentially ^ a citizen, while he was actually a chattel. The only real defence was necessity. As slavery then was mostly domestic, and ap- %- parently destined presently to expire, the writers of The Fed- ^ eralist could hardly be expected to consider the difficulty, which * events proved to amount to impossibility, of combining har-

moniously under the same political system two sets of States whose social systems were radically opposed to each other.

The vindication by The Federalist of the Supreme Court as the bulwark of a limited constitution against legislative en- croachment seems complete, and has been ratified by the experi- ence of more than a century. Yet the position of the court has not remained entirely unchanged. Instituted to uphold a federal compact, it is now in some measure controlling, by its ^Y judgments on political and financial questions, the policy of t^ a nation.

> / " When once an efficient national government is established, .' the best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but will also generally be appointed to manage it ; for although town, or county, or other contracted influence, may place men in state assemblies, or courts of justice, or senates, or executive departments; yet more general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications, will be necessary to recommend i men to offices under the national government, especially as it ' will have the widest field for choice, and never experience that ! want of proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the ' states. Hence it will result that the administration, the politi- cal councils, and judicial decisions of the national government will be more wise, systematical and judicious than those of individual states, and consequently more satisfactory with re-

SPECIAL INTRODUCTION ix

spect to the other nations, as well as more safe with respect to ourselves."*

Such was the forecast of the authors of The Federalist. It is not for a foreign writer to say how far it has been fulfilled.

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* No. III.

CONTENTS

PAGE

No. I- -{Hafm'ltoft.) *

On the Purpose of the Writer i

^ No. U.-{7ay.)

«^ Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence 5

No. III.— {Jay.)

Dangers from Foreign Influence 10

No. IV.— (7^/.)

Dangers from Foreign Influence 14

No. V.-iJay.)

Dangers from Foreign Influence 18

No. Nl.— [Hamilton.)

Dangers from Wars between the States 22

No. Wl.— {Hamilton.)

Possible Causes of War between the States 27

No. Ylll.— {Hamilton.)

Effects of Internal War 33

No. IX.— {Hamilton.)

Union a Safeguard against Faction and Insurrection 38

No. X.— {Madison.)

The Numerous Advantages of the Union 44

No. XL— {Hamilton.)

Utility of the Union in Respect to Commerce and a Navy 52

No. Xll.— {Hamilton.)

The Union in Respect to Revenue 58

♦These essays originally appeared above the general signature of Publius. The authorship credited here to Hamilton, Madison or Jay respectively is taken from a list of the authors compiled by President Madison himself.

xi

xii CONTENTS

PAGE

No. X.i\\.— {Hamilton.)

The Union and Economy in Revenue 64

No. YAV.—{Madiso7i.)

Extent of the Country no Objection to the Union 66

No. ^N .—{Hamilton.)

Legislative Defects of the Confederation 72

No. XVl.—{Ha?nilton.)

In Respect to Legislation for States Collectively 80

&^0. XV II.— {Hamilton.)

V^ As to the Tendency of Federal Governments 85

No. XVIIL — {Hamilton and Madison.')

Powers of the Confederation Compared with those of Ancient Republics 89

No. XIX. — {Hamilton and Madison.)

Further Comparisons 95

•

No. XX. — {Hamilton and Madison.)

The Union Compared with a Modern Republic loi

No. XX\.—{Ha7nilton.)

Defects of the Present Constitution 105

No. XXU.— {Hamilton.)

Further Defects of the Constitution no

No. XXIW. —{Hainilton.)

An Energetic Government Necessary to the Safety of the Union. 1 19

No. XXW .—{Hamilton.)

Concerning Standing Armies 124

No. XXN .—{Hamilton.)

The Care of the Common Defence 129

No. XXVI.— {Hamilton.)

Legislative Authority and the National Defence 134

CONTENTS xiii

PAGE

No. XXVU.— {Hamilton.)

The Constitution and a Standing Army 140

No. XXVl\\.—{Hatnilton.) ^ The Occasional Need of Force 144

No. X.X\X.— {Hamilton.)

Concerning Taxation 148

No. XXX.— {Hamilton.)

Concerning Taxation „ 153

\/^0. XXX\.— {Hamilton.)

State Control of Local Taxation 1 57 •

No. XXXW.— {Hamilton.)

Constitutional and State Authority Coequal in Taxation 16$

No. XXXWl.— {Hamilton.)

Concerning an Indefinite Power of Taxation 171

No. XXXW.— {Hamilton.)

Internal Taxation 177

No. XXXV.— {Hamilton.)

Concerning the Militia , 183

y^O. XXXVl.— {Hamilton.)

Difficulties Encountered in the Formation of a Constitution .... 189

\/^o. XXXVIL— {Madison.)

On the Formation of the Constitution 196

No. XXXVIU.— {Madison.)

The Plan of the Convention Republican in Principle 205

/No. XXXIX.— {Madison.)

An Objection to the Powers of the Convention Examined 211

y No. XL.— {Madison.)

Powers Proposed to be Vested in the Union 219

j^/l^O. XLl.— {Madison.)

Second Class of Powers Vested in the Union 228

xiv CONTENTS

PAGE

No. XLIL— (Madison.)

Fourth Class of Powers Vested in the Union 235

No. XLlU.—iMadisoH.)

Fifth Class of Powers Vested in the Union . 244

V y •s>;^No. XLIV.— (Madison.)

Supposed Dangers to State Governments from the Powers of the Union 252

%Wo. XLV.— (Madison.) ^ i/ Federal and State Governments and the People 257

A ;No. XLVh— (Madison.)

Y^ I Concerning the Separation of the Departments of Government. . 264

No. X\N\\.— (Madison.)

Constitutional Connection of the Departments of Government. . 271

No. X\J^\\\.— (Madison.)

A Further Consideration of the Constitutional Connection 276

No. XU.X.—(Hajnilton.) l^Methods for Revising the Constitution 281

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(pJ^No. "L.— {Hamilton.)

On Maintaining a Just Partition of Power among the Necessary Departments 284

No. LI. — (Hamilton.)

Of the House of Representatives 289

No. LII. — (Hamilton.)

On the Term of Service of Members of the House of Represen- tatives 294

No. lAU.— (Hamilton.)

As to the Ratio of Representation from the Various States 299

No. LI v.— (7^^.)

As to the Number of Representatives 305

No. \N .—(Hamilton.)

Objects of Federal Legislation and the Duties of Representatives. 310

CONTENTS XV

PAGE

No. IN\.— {Hamilton.)

Supposed Danger in the Plan of the Convention 314

No. \N\l.-~{Hamilt07i)

Future Numerical Increase in the House of Representatives. . . . 320

No. \y\\\.—{Hamilto7i,)

Concerning the Regulation of Elections 325

No. LIX. — {Hamilton)

Regulation of Elections by the Federal Government 330

. Pno. \.Y.— {Hamilton.)

Place and Period of Elections 336

No. I.XI.— {Hamilton.)

On the Constitution of the Senate 340

No. LXll.— {Hamilton,)

On the Duration of the Senatorial Term 346

No. LXIU.— {Hamilton.)

The Senate and the Treaty Power 354

No. LXIV.— {Hamilton.)

The Senate as a Court of Impeachment 360

No. LXV .—{Hamilton.)

Objections to the Senate as a Court of Impeachment 365

No. hXVl.— {Hamilton.)

Concerning the Executive Department 371

No. LXVIL— {Hamilton.) ' The System of Electing the President 375

No. LXVllL— {Hamilton.)

Analysis of Presidential Powers 379

No. LXIX.— {Hamilton.)

Unity of the Executive Desirable 386

^--sNo. LXX.— {Hamilton.) C^-^ The Length of the Presidential Term 394

xvi CONTENTS

PACK

No. I.XXI.— {Hamilton.)

On the Question of Re-election 398

No. \JXXll.—{Hainiiioft.)

The Compensation of the President 403

No. \JX.X\\l.— {Hamilton,)

Various Powers of the Executive 409

No. hXXlY.—iHamzlion.)

On the Treaty-making Power of the Executive 412

No. \.XXY . — {Hajnilton.)

The Presidential Power of Appointment ... 417

No. UXXYl.— {Hamilton.)

On Various Other Powers Vested in the President 422

No. "LXXYU.— {Hamilton)

Further Consideration of Presidential Authority 425

No. hXXYlW.— {Hamilton.)

An Examination of the Judiciary Department 427

No. 'LXX\X.—{Hafnilton.)

On the Compensation of the Judiciary 435

^No. UXXX.— {Hamilton.)

Extent of the Authority of the Judiciary 438

^^ No. \.XXX\.— {Hamilton.)

Divisions of the Judiciary 444

\/no. \.XXX\\.— {Hamilton.)

On the Powers of State and of Federal Courts 454

No. \.XXX\\\.— {Hamilton.)

Trial by Jury ' 458

\) VI "^oIlXXXW .—{Hamilton)

^----^^pn Alleged Defects in the Constitution 472

No. I.XXXY .—{Hamilton.)

Concluding Remarks 482

iqiTjiH

CHOICE EXAMPLES OF PALEOGRAPHY.

Fac-similes from Rare and Curious Manuscripts of the

Middle Ages.

PAGE OF THE BOOK OF EXODUS.

From a Flemish Old Testiunent written in the year 141^-

The reproduction of the first page of the Exodus here given is chiefly remarkable for the triple combination it presents of the Latin, Capetian (or Ludovician), and Gothic minuscule. Note the initial D, Gothic in character and overladen with or- nament, yet imposing even in its lack of delicacy. The text writing is in Gothic minuscule, but betrays distinct traces of the curved Latin script, as well as of the in- termediary forms of the time of St. Louis. The manuscript is a monument to the faithfulness displayed by copyists, in their darkest era, in executing the transcrip- tions from Holy Writ, and there are some pathetically modest interpolations at intervals in the manuscript from the hand of the copyist, such as the prayer to the reader :

" Qui legit emendat, scriptorem non reprehendat," and again,

" Scriptor scripsisset bene melius si potuisset,"

and finally this humble wish :

"Qui scripsit scripta. sua dextra sit henedicta."

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ILLUSTRATIONS Alexander Hamilton

Photogravure from the original miniature

Page of the Book of Exodus

Fac-simile manuscript of the Fifteenth Century

The Duel after the Masquerade

Photogravure from the original painting

Page from a Hungarian Discourse on the Grave .......

Fac-simile manuscript of the Tenth Century Page from a Commentary by St. Gregory .

Fac-simile manuscript of the Seventh Century

FACING PAGE

Frontispiece

. XVI

. lOO

. 176

204

THE FEDERALIST

No. I

ON THE PURPOSE OF THE WRITER

AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the — subsisting federal government, you are called upon to i^V ■*• deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance, compre- hending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the Union^ the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is jr^^ composed, the fate of an empire, in many respects, the most in- t^;,^, teresting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country by their conduct and example to decide the important question whether societies of men are really capable or not of establish- .i,^ w ing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend, for their political constitu- tions, on accident and force. If there be any truth in the re- mark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made ; and a wrong election of the part we shall act may in this view deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.

This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiassed by considerations not con- nected with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its discussion

2 THE FEDERALIST

a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, passions, and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of truth.

Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter, may readily be distin- guished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they hold under the State establishments — and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize them- selves by the confusions of their country or will flatter them- selves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies, than from its union under one government.

It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (mere- ly because their situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views : Candor will oblige us to admit, that even such men may be actuated by upright intentions ; and it cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources blameless at least, if not respectable ; the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears. So numerous, indeed, and so powerful are the causes, which serve to give a false bias j to the judgment, that we, upon many occasions, see wise and'^ood men on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in any controversy. And a further reason for caution in this respect might be drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists. Ambi- tion, avarice^ personal animosity, party opposition, and many other motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who support, as upon those who oppose, the right side of a question. Were there not even these induce- ments to moderation, nothing could be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit, which has at all times characterized political parties. For, in politics as in religion, it is equally absurd to

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 3

aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.

And yet however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as in all former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of angry and malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be led to con- clude that they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their opinions and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations and the bitterness of their invec- tives. An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of gov- ernment will be stigmatized, as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic power, and hostile to the principles of liberty. An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be represented as mere pretence and artifice ; the stale bait for popularity at the expense of public good. It will be for- gotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant of violent love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is too apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that the vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty ; that in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment their interests can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people than under the forbidding appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government. History will teach us that the former has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than the latter ; and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people ; commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.

In the course of the preceding observations I have had an eye, my fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost moment to your welfare by any im- pressions other than those which may result from the evidence of truth. You will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the general scope of them that they proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen.

4 THE FEDERALIST

I own to you that after having given it an attentive considera- tion I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves, which I do not feel. I will not amuse you with an appearance of delibera- tion, when I have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness of good intentions dis- dains ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply professions on this head. My motives must remain in the depository of my own breast ; my arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace the cause of truth.

I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following inter- esting particulars: The utility of the Union to your political prosperity ; the insufficiency of the present confederation to pre- serve that Union ; the necessity of a government at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the attainment of this object ; the conformity of the proposed Constitution to the true princi- ples of republican government ; its analogy to your own State Constitution ; and, lastly, the additional security, which its adop- tion will afford to the preservation of that species of govern- ment, to liberty and to property.

In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your atten- tion.

It may, perhaps, be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the utility of the Union, a point, no doubt, deeply en- graved on the hearts of the great body of the people in every State, and one which, it may be imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is that we already hear it whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new Constitution, that the Thir- teen States are of too great extent for any general system, and that we must of necessity resort to separate confederacies of dis- tinct portions of the whole.* This doctrine will, in all proba- bility, be gradually propagated, till it has votaries enough to countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing can be more

♦The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is held out in several of the late publications against the new Constitution.

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 5

evident, to those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject, than the alternative of an adoption of the new Constitu- tion or a dismemberment of the Union. It will, therefore, be of use to begin by examining the advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution. This shall accordingly con- stitute the subject of my next address.

PUBLIUS.

No. II

CONCERNING DANGERS FROM FOREIGN FORCE

AND INFLUENCE

WHEN the people of America reflect that they are now called upon to decide a question which in its conse- quences must prove one of the most important that ever engaged their attention, the propriety of their taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious, view of it will be evi- dent. ^iNFothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government, and it is equally undeniable that, whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights, in order to vest it with requisite powers.^- It is well worthy of consideration, therefore, whether it would con- duce more to the interest of the people of America, that they should to all general purposes^ be one nation^ under one federal government, or that they should divide themselves into separate confederacies, and give to the head of each the same kind of powers which they are advised to place in one national govern- ment.

It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted opin- ion that the prosperity of the people of America depended on their continuing firmly united, and the wishes, prayers, and efforts of our best and wisest citizens have been constantly directed to that object. But politicians now appear who insist that this opinion is erroneous, and that instead of looking for safety and happiness in union we ought to seek it in a divis-

6 THE FEDERALIST

ion of the States into distinct confederacies or sovereignties. However extraordinary this new doctrine may appear, it, nevertheless, has its advocates ; and certain characters who were much opposed to it formerly, are at present of the num- ber. Whatever may be the arguments or inducements which have wrought this change in the sentiments and declarations of these gentlemen, it certainly would not be wise in the peo- ple at large to adopt these new political tenets without being fully convinced that they are founded in truth and sound policy.

It has often given me pleasure to observe that independent America was not composed of detached and distant terri- tories, but that one connected, fertile, wide-spreading country was the portion of our Western sons of liberty. Providence has in a particular manner blessed it with a variety of soils and productions, and watered it with innumerable streams, for the delight and accommodation of its inhabitants. A succes- sion of navigable waters forms a kind of chain round its bor- ders, as if to bind it together ; while the most noble rivers in the world, running at convenient distances, present them with highways for the easy communication of friendly aids, and the mutual transportation and exchange of their various commodi- ties.

With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that Provi- dence has been pleased to give this one connected country, to one united people ; a people descended from the same ances- tors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint coun- sels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long j, and bloody war, have nobly established their general liberty | and independence. '(

This country and this people seem to have been made for |

each other, and it appears as if it was the design of Provi- f

dence that an inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by the strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties.

Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all orders and denominations of men among us. To all general purposes we have uniformly been one people : each individual citizen

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 7

everywhere enjoying the same national rights, privileges, and protection. As a nation we have made peace and war: as a nation we have vanquished our common enemies : as a nation we have formed alliances and made treaties, and entered into various compacts and conventions with foreign States.

A strong sense of the value and blessings of Union induced the people, at a very early period, to institute a federal govern- ment to preserve and perpetuate it. They formed it almost as soon as they had a political existence ; nay, at a time when their habitations were in flames, when many of their citizens were bleeding, and when the progress of hostility and desola- tion left little room for those calm and mature inquiries and reflections which must ever precede the formation of a wise and well-balanced government for a free people. It is not to be wondered at that a government instituted in times so inaus- picious should on experiment be found greatly deficient and inadequate to the purpose it was intended to answer.

This intelligent people perceived and regretted these defects. Still continuing no less attached to Union, than enamoured of liberty, they observed the danger, which immediately threat- ened the former and more remotely the latter ; and being per- suaded that ample security for both could only be found in a national government more wisely framed, they, as with one voice, convened the late Convention at Philadelphia, to take that important subject under consideration.

This Convention, composed of men who possessed the con- fidence of the people, and many of whom had become highly distinguished by their patriotism, virtue, and wisdom, in times which tried the minds and hearts of men, undertook the ardu- ous task. In the mild season of peace, with minds unoccupied by other subjects, they passed many months in cool, uninter- rupted, and daily consultations; and finally, without having been awed by power, or influenced by any passions except love for their country, they presented and recommended to the people the plan produced by their joint and very unanimous councils.

i\dmit — for so is the fact — that this plan is only recom- mended, not imposed, yet let it be remembered that it is neither recommended to blind approbation nor to blind reprobation ; but to that sedate and candid consideration which the magni-

8 THE FEDERALIST

tude and importance of the subject demand, and which it cer- tainly ought to receive. But this (as was remarked in the foregoing number of this paper) is more to be wished than expected, that it may be so considered and examined. Ex- perience on a former occasion teaches us not to be too san- guine in such hopes. It is not yet forgotten that well-grounded apprehensions of imminent danger induced the people of America to form the memorable Congress of 1774. That body recommended certain measures to their constituents, and the event proved their wisdom ; yet it is fresh in our memories how soon the press began to teem with pamphlets and weekly papers against those very measures. Not only many of the officers of government, who obeyed the dictates of personal interest, but others, from a mistaken estimate of consequences, or the undue influence of former attachments, or whose ambi- tion aimed at objects which did not correspond with the public good, were indefatigable in their endeavors to persuade the people to reject the advice of that patriotic Congress. Many, indeed, were deceived and deluded, but the great majority of the people reasoned and decided judiciously; and happy they are in reflecting that they did so.

They considered that the Congress was composed of many wise and experienced men. That being convened from dif- ferent parts of the country, they brought with them and com- municated to each other a variety of useful information. That in the course of the time they passed together in inquiring into and discussing the true interests of their country, they must have acquired very accurate knowledge on that head. That they were individually interested in the public liberty and prosperity, and therefore that it was not less their inclina- tion than their duty to recommend only such measures as after the most mature deliberation they really thought pru- dent and advisable.

These and similar considerations, then, induced the peo- ple to rely greatly on the judgment and integrity of the Con- gress ; and they took their advice, notwithstanding the various arts and endeavors used to deter and dissuade them from it. But if the people at large had reason to confide in the men of that Congress, few of whom had then been fully tried or generally known, still greater reason have they now to respect

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 9

the judgment and advice of the Convention, for it is well knov^n that some of the most distinguished members of that Congress, who have been since tried and justly approved for patriotism and abilities, and who have grown old in acquiring political information, were also members of this Convention, and carried into it their accumulated knowledge and experi- ence.

*'* It is worthy of remark that not only the first, but every succeeding Congress, as well as the late Convention, have in-, variably joined with the people in thinking that the prosperity*^ of America depended on its Union.,- To preserve and perpetu- ate it was the great object of the people in forming that Con- vention, and it is also the great object of the plan which the Convention has advised them to adopt. With what propriety, therefore, or for what good purposes, are attempts at this particular period made by some men to depreciate the impor- tance of the Union? or why is it suggested that three or four confederacies would be better than one? I am persuaded in my own mind that the people have always thought right on this subject, and that their universal and uniform attachment to the cause of the Union rests on great and weighty reasons, which I shall endeavor to develop and explain in some ensu- ing papers. ^ They who promote the idea of substituting a number of distinct confederacies in the room of the plan of 1 the Convention, seem clearly to foresee that the rejection of it would put the continuance of the Union in the utmost jeopardy: that certainly would be the case, and I sincerely wish that it may be as clearly foreseen by every good citizen, that, whenever the dissolution of the Union arrives, America will have reason to exclaim in the words of the poet, " Fare- well ! a long farewell to all my greatness."^

PUBLIUS.

\/

lo THE FEDERALIST

No. Ill

DANGERS FROM FOREIGN INFLUENCE

IT is not a new observation that the people of any country (if, Hke the Americans, inteUigent and well informed) seldom adopt, and steadily persevere for many years in, an erroneous opinion respecting their interests. That con- sideration naturally tends to create great respect for the high opinion which ^the people of America have so long and uni- formly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly united under one federal government, vested with sufficient powers for all general and national purposes./

The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which appear to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become convinced that they are cogent and conclusive.

Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety seems to be the first. The safety of the peo- ple doubtless has relation to a great variety of circumstances and considerations, and consequently affords great latitude to those who wish to define it precisely and comprehensively.

At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well against dangers from foreign arms and influence as from dangers of the like kind arising from domestic causes. As the former of these comes first in order, it is proper it should be the first discussed. Let us therefore proceed to examine whether the people are not right in their opinion that a cordial Union under an efficient national government affords them the best security that can be devised against hostilities from abroad.

'The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world will always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the causes, whether real or pretended, which provoke or invite them. If this remark be just, it be- comes useful to inquire whether so many just causes of war are likely to be given by United America as by disunited Amer- ica? for if it should turn out that United America will probably give the fewest, then it will follow that in this respect the Union

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY n

tends most to preserve the people in a state of peace with other nations.

The just causes of war for the most part arise either from violations of treaties or from direct violence. America has al- ready formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia, are maritime, and therefore able to annoy and injure us: She has also extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain, and Britain, and, with respect to the two lat- ter, has, in addition, the circumstance of neighborhood to at- tend to.

It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations toward all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctu- ally done by one national government than it could be either by thirteen separate states or by three or four distinct con- federacies. ^

Because when once an efficient national government is es- tablished,^the best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to manage it; for although town or country, or other contracted influence, may place men in State assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments, yet more general and extensive repu- tation for talents and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national government — especially as it will have the widest field for choice, and never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncom- mon in some of the States. Hence it will result that the ad- ministration, the political counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national government will be more wise, systematical, and judicious than those of individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as more safe with respect to us. *^

Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense, and executed in the same manner; whereas adjudications on the same points and questions, in thir- teen states, or in three or four confederacies, will not always ac- cord or be consistent; and that as well from the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by different and inde- pendent governments, as from the different local laws and in-

12 THE FEDERALIST

terests which may affect and influence them. The wisdom of the Convention, in committing such questions to the jurisdic- tion and judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national government cannot be too much commended.

Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and justice; but those temptations not reaching the other States, and consequently having little or no influence on the national government, the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and justice be preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great weight to this reasoning.

Because even if the governing party in a State should be disposed to resist such temptations, yet as such temptations may, and commonly do, result from circumstances peculiar to the State, and may affect a great number of the inhabitants, the governing party may not always be able, if willing, to pre- vent the injustice meditated or to punish the aggressors. But the national government, not being affected by those local cir- cumstances, will neither be induced to commit the wrong them- selves nor want power or inclination to prevent or punish its commission by others.

/ So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations of treaties and the laws of nations afford just causes of war, they are less to be apprehended under one general government than under several lesser ones, and in that respect the former most favors the safety of the people.

As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good national government affords vastly more security against dan- gers of that sort than can be derived from any other quarter.

Because such violences are more frequently caused by the passions and interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two States than of the Union. Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of the present federal gov- ernment, feeble as it is ; but there are several instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual States, who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offences, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants.

The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, border-

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 13

ing on some States, and not on others, naturally confines the causes of quarrel more immediately to the borderers. The bor- dering States, if any, will be those who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense of apparent interest or in- jury, will be most likely, by direct violence, to excite war with those nations; and nothing can so effectually obviate that dan- ger, as a national government, whose wisdom and prudence will not be diminished by the passions which actuate the parties immediately interested.

But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and settle them amicably. They will be more temperate and cool, and in that respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to act advisedly than the offending State. The pride of States, as well as of men, naturally disposes them to justify all their actions, and opposes their acknowledg- ing, correcting, or repairing their errors and offences. The na* tional government, in such cases, will not be affected by this pride, but will proceed with moderation and candor to consider and decide on the means most proper to extricate them from the difficulties which threaten them.

Besides it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations, and compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State or Confederacy of little consideration or power.

In the year 1685, the State of Genoa, having offended Louis XIV, endeavored to appease him. He demanded that they should send their Doge, or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to France, to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They were obliged to submit to it, for the sake of peace. Would he on any occasion either have demanded or have received the like humiliation from Spain or Britain or any other powerful nation?

PUBLIUS.

14 THE FEDERALIST

No. IV

DANGERS FROM FOREIGN INFLUENCE

MY last paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the people would be best secured by Union, against the danger it may be exposed to by just causes of war given to other nations; and those reasons show that such causes would not only be more rarely given, but would also be more easily accommodated by a national government than either by the State governments or the proposed little confederacies.

But the safety of the people of America against dangers from foreign force depends not only on their forbearing to give just causes of war to other nations, but also on their placing and continuing themselves in such a situation as not to invite hos- tility or insult; for it need not be observed that there are pre- tended as well as just causes of war.

It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it; nay, that absolute mon- archs will often make war when their nations are to get noth- ing by it, but for purposes and objects merely personal, such as a thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, am- bition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their par- ticular families, or partisans. These, and a variety of motives, which afifect only the mind of the sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice, or the voice and interests of his people. But, independent of these inducements to war, which are more prevalent in absolute monarchies, but which well deserve our attention, there are others which affect nations as often as kings; and some of them will on examina- tion be found to grow out of our relative situation and circum- stances.

With France and with Britain, we are rivals in the fisheries, and can supply their markets cheaper than they can themselves, notwithstanding any efforts to prevent it by bounties on their own, or duties on foreign fish.

With them and with most other European nations, we are rivals in navigation and the carrying trade; and we shall deceive

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 15

ourselves, if we suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish: for as our carrying trade cannot increase, without in some degree diminishing theirs, it is more their interest, and will be more their policy, to restrain, than to promote it.

In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one nation, inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which they had in a manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves with commodities which we used to purchase from them.

The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels can- not give pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this continent, because the cheapness and excellence of our productions, added to the circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and address of our merchants and navigators, will give us a greater share in the advantages which those ter- ritories afford, than consists with the wishes or policy of their respective sovereigns.

Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on the one side, and Britain excludes us from the St. Lawrence on the other; nor will either of them permit the other waters, which are between them and us, to become the means of mutual intercourse and traffic.

From these and such like considerations, which might, if con- sistent with prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy to see that jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds and cabinets of other nations; and that we are not to expect they should regard our advancement in union, in power and consequence by land and by sea, with an eye of indif- ference and composure.

The people of America are aware that inducements to war may arise out of these circumstances, as well as from others not so obvious at present; and that whenever such inducements may find fit time and opportunity for operation, pretences to color and justify them will not be wanting. Wisely, therefore, do they consider Union and a good national government as necessary to put and keep them in such a situation as, instead of inviting war, will tend to repress and discourage it. That situation consists in the best possible state of defence, and nec- essarily depends on the government, the arms, and the re- sources of the country.

i6 THE FEDERALIST

As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and cannot be provided for without government, either one or more or many, let us inquire whether one good government is not, relative to the object in question, more competent than any other given number whatever.

^ One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and .experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union ^ they may be found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize, assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In the formation of treaties it will regard the interest of the whole, and the particular interests of the parts as connected with that of the whole. It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the defence of any par- ticular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State governments or separate confederacies can possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system. It can place the militia under one plan of discipline, and, by putting their officers in a proper Hne of subordination to the chief magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, and thereby render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into three or four dis- tinct independent bodies.

"* What would the militia of Britain be, if the English militia obeyed the Government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the Government of Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the Government of Wales? Suppose an invasion: would those three governments (if they agreed at all) be able, with all their respective forces, to operate against the enemy so effectually as the single Government of Great Britain would?

We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may come, if we are wise, when the fleets of America may engage attention. But if one national government had not so regulated the navigation of Britain as to make it a nursery for seamen — if one national government had not called forth all the national means and materials for forming fleets, their prow- ess and their thunder would never have been celebrated. Let England have its navigation and fleet — let Scotland have its navigation and fleet — let Wales have its navigation and fleet — let Ireland have its navigation and fleet — let those four of the constituent parts of the British Empire be under four inde-

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 17

pendent governments, and it is easy to perceive how soon they would each dwindle into comparative insignificance!

Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into thirteen, or if you please into three or four independent governments, what armies could they raise and pay? what fleets could they ever hope to have? If one was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and spend their blood and money in its defence? Would there be no danger of their being flat- tered into neutrality by specious promises or seduced by a too great fondness for peace to decline hazarding their tranquillity and present safety for the sake of neighbors, of whom perhaps they have been jealous, and whose importance they are con- tent to see diminished ? Although such conduct would not be wise, it would, nevertheless, be natural. The history of the States of Greece and of other countries abounds with such in- stances; and it is not improbable that what has so often hap- pened would, under similar circumstances, happen again.

But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State or confederacy. How and when and in what propor- tion shall aids of men and money be afforded? Who shall com- mand the allied armies, and from which of them shall he re- ceive his orders? Who shall settle the terms of peace, and in case of disputes what umpire shall decide between them, and compel acquiescence? Various difficulties and inconveniences would be inseparable from such a situation; whereas one gov- ernment, watching over the general and common interests, and combining and directing the powers and resources of the whole, would be free from all these embarrassments and conduce far more to the safety of the people.

But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under one national government, or split into a number of con- federacies, certain it is that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is; and they will act toward us accordingly, if they see that our national government is efficient and well ad- ministered— our trade prudently regulated — our militia proper- ly organized and disciplined — our resources and finances dis- creetly managed — our credit re-established — our people free, contented, and united, they will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment. If, on the other hand, they find us either destitute of an effectual

i8 THE FEDERALIST

government (each State doing right or wrong, as to its rulers may seem convenient) or spUt into three or four independent and probably discordant republics or confederacies, one inclin- ing to Britain, another to France, and a third to Spain, and perhaps played off against each other by the three, what a poor, pitiful figure will America make in their eyes ! How liable would she become, not only to their contempt, but to their out- rage; and how soon would dear-bought experience proclaim that when a people or family so divide, it never fails to be against themselves?

PUBLIUS.

No. V

DANGERS FROM FOREIGN INFLUENCE

QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of July i, 1706, to the Scotch Parliament, makes some observations on the impor- tance of the union then forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I shall present the pub- lic with one or two extracts from it. " An entire and perfect Union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It will se- cure your religion, liberty, and property, remove the animosi- ties amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and differences be- twixt our two kingdoms. It must increase your strength, riches, and trade; and by this Union the whole Island being joined in affection and free from all apprehensions of different interest, will be enabled to resist all its enemies. . . . We most earnestly recommend to you calmness and unanimity in this great and weighty affair, that the Union may be brought to a happy conclusion, being the only effectual way to secure our present and future happiness; and disappoint the designs of our and your enemies, who will doubtless, on this occasion, use their utmost endeavors to prevent or delay this Union/'

It was remarked in the preceding paper that weakness and divisions at home would invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing would tend more to secure us from them than Union, strength, and good government within ourselves. This sub- ject is copious and cannot easily be exhausted.

The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 19

general the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons. We may profit by their experience, without paying the price which it cost them. Although it seems obvious to common- sense that the people of such an island should be but one na- tion, yet we find that they were for ages divided into three, and that those three were almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one another. Notwithstanding their true in- terest, with respect to the continental nations, was really the same, yet, by the arts and policy and practices of those nations, their mutual jealousies were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a long series of years they were far more inconvenient and troublesome than they were useful and assisting to each other.

Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four nations, would not the same thing happen? would not similar jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished? In- stead of their being " joined in afTection, and free from all ap- prehension of different interests," envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection, and the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the general interests of all Amer- ica, would be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most other bordering nations, they would always be either involved in disputes and war or live in the constant apprehension of them.

The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies cannot reasonably suppose that they would long remain ex- actly on an equal footing in point of strength, even if it was^ possible to form them so at first: but admitting that to be prac- ticable, yet what human contrivance can secure the continuance of such equality? Independent of those local circumstances which tend to beget and increase power in one part, and to impede its progress in another, we must advert to the effects of that superior policy and good management which would probably distinguish the government of one above the rest, and by which their relative equality in strength and consideration would be destroyed. For it cannot be presumed that the same degree of sound policy, prudence, and foresight would uni- formly be observed by each of these confederacies for a long succession of years.

Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen — and happen it would — that any one of these nations or confeder-

20 THE FEDERALIST

acies should rise on the scale of political importance much above the degree of her neighbors, that moment would those neighbors behold her with envy and with fear.: Both those passions would lead them to countenance, if not to promote, whatever might promise to diminish her importance; and would also restrain them from measures calculated to advance or even to secure her prosperity. Much time would not be necessary to enable her to discern these unfriendly dispositions. She would soon begin, not only to lose confidence in her neigh- bors, but also to feel a disposition equally unfavorable to them.

^Distrust naturally creates distrust, and by nothing is good-will and kind conduct more speedily changed than by invidious jeal- ousies and uncandid imputations, whether expressed or im- plied.

^ The North is generally the region of strength, and many local circumstances render it probable that the most northern of the proposed confederacies would, at a period not very dis- tant, be unquestionably more formidable than any of the oth- ers. No sooner would this become evident than the Northern hive would excite the same ideas and sensations in the more southern parts of America which it formerly did in the south- ern parts of Europe. Nor does it appear to be a rash conject- ure that its young swarms might often be tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields and milder air of their lux- urious and more delicate neighbors.

They who well consider the history of similar divisions and confederacies, will find abundant reason to apprehend that those in contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as they would be borderers; that they would neither love nor trust one another, but on the contrary would be a prey to dis- cord, jealousy, and mutual injuries; in short, that they would place us exactly in the situations in which some nations doubt- less wish to see us, viz., formidable only to each other.

From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are greatly mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive might be formed between these confederacies, and would produce that combination and union of wills, of arms, and of resources, which would be necessary to put and keep them in a formidable state of defence against foreign enemies. When did the independent States, into which Britain and

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 21

Spain were formerly divided, combine in such alliances, or unite their forces against a foreign enemy? The proposed confed- eracies will be distinct nations. Each of them would have its commerce with foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties; and as their productions and commodities are different, and proper for different markets, so would those treaties be essentially dif- ferent. Different commercial concerns must create different interests, and of course different degrees of political attachment to and connection with different foreign nations. Hence it might and probably would happen that the foreign nation with whom the Southern confederacy might be at war would be the one with whom the Northern confederacy would be the most desirous of preserving peace and friendship. An alliance so contrary to their immediate interest would not, therefore, be easy to form, nor, if formed, would it be observed and fulfilled with perfect good faith.

Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, neighboring nations, acting under the impulse of opposite in- terests and unfriendly passions, would frequently be found tak;>r ing different sides. Considering our distance from Europe, it would be more natural for these confederacies to apprehend danger from one another than from distant nations, and there- fore that each of them should be more desirous to guard against the others, by the aid of foreign alliances, than to guard against foreign dangers by alliances between themselves. And here let us not forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our ports, and foreign armies into our country, than it is to persuade or compel them to depart. How many con- quests did the Romans and others make in the characters of allies, and what innovations did they, under the same charac- ter, introduce into the governments of those whom they pre- tended to protect!

Let carrdid men judge, then, whether the division of America into any given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure us against the hostilities and improper interference of foreign nations.

PUBLIUS.

2 2 THE FEDERALIST

No. VI

DANGERS FROM WAR BETWEEN THE STATES

THE three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state of disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now proceed to delineate dan- gers of a different and, perhaps, still more alarming kind, those which will in all probability flow from dissensions between the States themselves, and from domestic factions and convulsions. These have been already in some instances slightly anticipated; but they deserve a more particular and more full investigation.

A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously doubt that, if these States should either be wholly disunited or only united in partial confederacies, the subdi- visions into which they might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each other. To presume a want of motives for such contests, as an argument against their exist- ence, would be to forget that men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious. To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties, situated in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.

The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. There are some which have a general and almost constant oper- ation upon the collective bodies of society. Of this descrip- tion are the love of power, or the desire of pre-eminence and dominion — the jealousy of power or the desire of equality and safety. There are others which have a more circumscribed, though an equally operative, influence within their spheres. Such are the rivalships and competitions of commerce between commercial nations. And there are others, not less numerous than either of the former, which take their origin entirely in private passions; in the attachments, enmities, interests, hopes, and fears of leading individuals in the communities of which they are members. Men of this class, whether the favorites of a king or of a people, have in too many instances abused the

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY. 23

confidence they possessed; and assuming the pretext of some public motive, have not scrupled to sacrifice the national tran- quillity to personal advantage or personal gratification.

The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the resentment of a prostitute,* at the expense of much of the blood and treas- ure of his countrymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the city of the Samnians. The same man, stimulated by private pique against the Megarensians, another nation of Greece, or to avoid a prosecution with which he was threatened as an accomplice in a supposed theft of the statuary of Phidias, or to get rid of the accusations prepared to be brought against him for dissipating the funds of the State in the purchase of popu- larity, or from a combination of all these causes, was the prim- itive author of that famous and fatal war, distinguished in the Grecian annals by the name of the Peloponnesian War, which, after various vicissitudes, intermissions, and renewals, terminat- ed in the ruin of the Athenian Commonwealth.

The ambitious cardinal, who was prime minister to Henry VIII, permitting his vanity to aspire to the triple crown, enter- tained hopes of succeeding in the acquisition of that splendid prize by the influence of the Emperor Charles V. To' secure the favor and interest of this enterprising and powerful mon- arch, he precipitated England into a war with France, contrary to the plainest dictates of policy, and at the hazard of the safety and independence as well of the kingdom over which he pre- sided by his counsels as of Europe in general. For if there ever was a sovereign who bid fair to realize the project of uni- versal monarchy it was the Emperor Charles V, of whose in- trigues Wolsey was at once the instrument and the dupe.

The influence which the bigotry of one female, f the petulance of another, J and the cabals of a third,§ had in the contemporary policy, ferments, and pacifications of a considerable part of Europe, are topics that have been too often descanted upon not to be generally known.

To multiply examples of the agency of personal considera- tions in the production of great national events, either foreign or domestic, according to their direction, would be an unneces- sary waste of time. Those who have but a superficial acquaint-

* Aspasia, vide Plutarch's " Life of Pericles." t Madame de Maintenon.

X Duchess of Marlborough. g Madame de Pompadour.

24 THE FEDERALIST

ance with the sources from which they are to be drawn, will themselves recollect a variety of instances; and those who have a tolerable knowledge of human nature will not stand in need of such lights, to form their opinion either of the reality or extent of that agency. Perhaps, however, a reference tending to illustrate the general principle may with propriety be made to a case which has lately happened among ourselves. If Shays had not been a desperate debtor, it is much to be doubted whether Massachusetts would have been plunged into a civil war.

But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience in this particular, there are still to be found visionary or de- signing men who stand ready to advocate the paradox of per- petual peace between the States, though dismembered and alien- ated from each other. The genius of republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors which have so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics, like ours, will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. They will be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and concord.

Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the true interest of all nations to cultivate the same benevolent and philosophic spirit? If this be their true interest, have they in fact pursued it? Has it not, on the contrary, invariably been found that momentary passions, and immediate interests, have a more active and im^perious control over human conduct than general or remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice? Have republics in practice been less addicted to war than mon- archies? Are not the former administered by men as well as the latter? Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitions, that afifect nations as well as kings? Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities? Is it not well known that their determinations are often governed by a few individuals in whom they place confidence, and are, of course, liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those individuals? Has commerce hitherto done anything more than ch-ange the objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 25

enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been as many wars founded upon commercial motives, since ■ that has become the prevailing system of nations, as were be- i fore occasioned by the cupidity of territory or dominion? Has not the spirit of commerce, in many instances, administered new incentives to the appetite, both for the one and for the other? Let experience, the least fallible guide of human opin- ions, be appealed to for an answer to these inquiries.

Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics, two of them, Athens and Cathage, of the commercial kind; yet were they as often engaged in wars offensive and defensive as the neighboring monarchies of the same times. Sparta was little better than a well-regulated camp; and Rome was never sated of carnage and conquest.

Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the aggressor in the very war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal had carried her arms into the heart of Italy and to the gates of Rome, before Scipio, in turn, gave him an overthrow in the territories of Carthage and made a conquest of the common- wealth.

Venice, in latter times, figured more than once in wars of ambition; till becoming an object of terror to the other Italian States, Pope Julius II found means to accomplish that formida- ble league,* which gave a deadly blow to the power and pride of this haughty republic.

The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts and taxes, took a leading and conspicuous part in the wars of Europe. They had furious contests with England for the dominion of the sea, and were among the most persevering and most implacable of the opponents of Louis XIV.

In the government of Britain the representatives of the peo- ple compose one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has been for ages the predominant pursuit of that country. Few nations, nevertheless, have been more frequently engaged in war; and the wars in which that kingdom has been engaged have, in numerous instances, proceeded from the people.

There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popu- lar as royal wars. The cries of the nation and the importuni-

♦ The League of Cambray, comprehending: the Emperor, the King of France, the King ^of Aragon, and most of the Italian princes and States.

26 THE FEDERALIST

ties of their representatives have, upon various occasions, dragged their monarchs into war, or continued them in it, con- trary to their inclinations, and sometimes contrary to the real interests of the State. In that memorable struggle for supe- riority between the rival houses of Austria and Bourbon, which so long kept Europe in a flame, it is well known that the an- tipathies of the English against the French, seconding the am- bition or rather the avarice of a favorite leader,* protracted the war beyond the limits marked out by sound policy, and for a considerable time in opposition to the views of the court.

The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have in a great measure grown out of commercial considerations — the desire of supplanting, and the fear of being supplanted, either in par- ticular branches of traffic or in the general advantages of trade and navigation.

From this summary of what has taken place in other coun- tries, whose situations have borne the nearest resemblance to our own, what reason can we have to confide in those reveries, which would seduce us into an expectation of peace and cor- diality between the members of the present confederacy, in a state of separation? Have we not already seen enough of the fallacy and extravagance of those idle theories which have amused us with promises of an exemption from the imperfec- tions, weaknesses, and evils incident to society in every shape? Is it not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our political conduct, that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue?

Let the point of extreme depression to which our national dignity and credit have sunk ; let the inconveniences felt every- where from a lax and ill-administration of government; let the revolt of a part of the State of North Carolina, the late menac- ing disturbances in Pennsylvania, and the actual insurrections and rebellions in Massachusetts, declare

So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding with the tenets of those who endeavor to lull asleep our appre- hensions of discord and hostility between the States, in the event of disunion, that it has from long observation of the

* The Duke of Marlborough.

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 27

progress of society become a sort of axiom in politics, that vicinity, or nearness of situation, constitutes nations natural enemies. An intelligent writer expresses himself on this sub- ject to this effect: *' Neighboring Nations [says he] are nat- urally enemies of each other, unless their common weakness forces them to league in a confederate republic, and their constitution prevents the differences that neighborhood occa- sions, extinguishing that secret jealousy, which disposes all States to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their neigh- bors." * This passage, at the same time, points out the evil and suggests the remedy.

PUBLIUS.

No. VII

POSSIBLE CAUSES OF WAR BETWEEN THE

STATES

IT is sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what inducements could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each other? It would be a full answer to this question to say — precisely the same inducements which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the nations in the world. But unfortunately for us, the question admits of a more particu- lar answer. There are causes of differences within our immedi- ate contemplation, of the tendency of which, even under the re- straints of a federal Constitution, we have had sufficient experience, to enable us to form a judgment of what might be expected, if those restraints were removed.

Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the most fertile sources of hostility among nations. Perhaps the greatest proportion of the wars that have desolated the earth have sprung from this origin. This cause would exist, among us, in full force. We have a vast tract of unsettled territory within the boundaries of the United States. There still are dis- cordant and undecided claims between several of them ; and the dissolution of the Union would lay a foundation for similar claims between them all. It is well known that they have here- tofore had serious and animated discussions concerning the

* Vide " Principes des N^gociations," par I'Abbfe de Mably.

28 THE FEDERALIST

right to the lands which were ungranted at the time of the Rev- olution, and which usually went under the name of " crown lands." The States within the limits of whose colonial gov- ernments they were comprised, have claimed them as their prop- erty ; the others have contended that the rights of the crown in this article devolved upon the Union; especially as to all that part of the Western territory which, either by actual possession or through the submission of the Indian proprietors, was sub- jected to the jurisdiction of the King of Great Britain, till it was relinquished in the treaty of peace. This, it has been said, was at all events an acquisition to the confederacy by compact with a foreign power. It has been the prudent policy of Congress to appease this controversy, by prevailing upon the States to make cessions to the United States for the benefit of the whole. This has been so far accomplished, as, under a continuation of the Union, to afford a decided prospect of an amicable termina- tion of the dispute. A dismemberment of the confederacy, however, would revive this dispute, and would create others on the same subject. At present, a large part of the vacant West- ern territory is, by cession at least, if not by any anterior right, the common property of the Union. If that were at an end, the States which made the cession, on a principle of federal compro- mise, would be apt, when the motive of the grant had ceased, to reclaim the lands as a reversion. The other States would no doubt insist on a proportion, by right of representation. Their argument would be that a grant, once made, could not be re- voked, and that the justice of their participating in territory acquired or secured by the joint efforts of the confederacy re- mained undiminished. If, contrary to probability, it should be admitted by all the States, that each had a right to a share of this common stock, there would still be a difficulty to be sur- mounted as to a proper rule of apportionment. Different prin- ciples would be set up by different States for this purpose ; and as they would affect the opposite interests of the parties, they might not easily be susceptible of a pacific adjustment.

In the wide field of Western territory, therefore, we perceive an ample theatre for hostile pretensions, without any umpire or common judge to interpose between the contending parties. To reason from the past to the future, we shall have good ground to apprehend that the sword would sometimes be appealed to as

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 29

the arbiter of their differences. The circumstances of the dis- pute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania respecting the land at Wyoming, admonish us not to be sanguine in expecting an easy accommodation of such differences. The Articles of Con- federation obliged the parties to submit the matter to the decis- ion of a federal court. The submission was made, and the court decided in favor of Pennsylvania. But Connecticut gave strong indications of dissatisfaction with that determination; nor did she appear to be entirely resigned to it, till, by negotiation and management, something like an equivalent was found for the loss she supposed herself to have sustained. Nothing here said is intended to convey the slightest censure on the conduct of that State. She no doubt sincerely believed herself to have been in- jured by the decision; and States, like individuals, acquiesce with great reluctance in determinations to their disadvantage.

Those who had an opportunity of seeing the inside of the transactions, which attended the progress of the controversy be- tween this State and the district of Vermont, can vouch the opposition we experienced, as well from States not interested, as from those which were interested in the claim ; and can attest the danger to which the peace of the confederacy might have been exposed, had this State attempted to assert its rights by force. Two motives preponderated in that opposition: one, a jealousy entertained of our future power ; and the other, the in- terest of certain individuals of influence in the neighboring States, who had obtained grants of lands under the actual gov- ernment of that district. Even the States which brought for- ward claims in contradiction to ours, seemed more solicitous to dismember this State than to establish their own pretensions. These were New Hampshire, Massachusetts^ and Connecticut. New Jersey and Rhode Island, upon all occasions, discovered a warm zeal for the independence of Vermont ; and Maryland, till alarmed by the appearance of a connection between Canada and that place, entered deeply into the same views. These be- ing small States, saw with an unfriendly eye the perspective of our growing greatness. In a review of these transactions we may trace some of the causes, which would be likely to embroil the States with each other, if it should be their unpropitious destiny to become disunited.

The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful

30

THE FEDERALIST

source of contention. The States less favorably circumstanced would be desirous of escaping from the disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in the advantages of their more fortu- nate neighbors. Each State, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial polity peculiar to itself. This would occasion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which would beget discontent. The habits of intercourse, on the basis of equal privileges, to which we have been accustomed from the earliest settlement of the country, would give a keener edge to those causes of discontent, than they would naturally have, in- dependent of this circumstance. We should be ready to denom- inate injuries those things which were in reality the justifiable acts of independent sovereignties consulting a distinct interest. The spirit of enterprise, which characterizes the commercial part of America, has left no occasion of displaying itself unim- proved. It is not at all probable that this unbridled spirit would pay much respect to those regulations of trade by which particu- lar States might endeavor to secure exclusive benefits to their own citizens. The infractions of these regulations on one side, the efforts to prevent and repel them on the other, would nat- urally lead to outrages, and these to reprisals and wars.

The opportunities which some States would have of render- ing others tributary to them, by commercial regulations, would be impatiently submitted to by the tributary States. The rela- tive situation of New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey would afford an example of this kind. New York, from the necessi- ties of revenue, must lay duties on her importations. A great part of these duties must be paid by the inhabitants of the two other States in the capacity of consumers of what we import. New York would neither be willing nor able to forego this ad- vantage. Her citizens would not consent that a duty paid by them should be remitted in favor of the citizens of her neigh- bors ; nor would it be practicable, if there were not this impedi- ment in the way, to distinguish the customers in our own mar- kets. Would Connecticut and New Jersey long submit to be taxed by New York for her exclusive benefit? Should we be long permitted to remain in the quiet and undisturbed enjoy- ment of a metropolis, from the possession of which we derived an advantage so odious to our neighbors, and, in their opinion, so oppressive ? Should we be able to preserve it against the in-

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 31

cumbent weight of Connecticut on the one side, and the co-oper- ating pressure of New Jersey on the other? These are ques- tions that temerity alone will answer in the affirmative.

The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of col- lision between the separate States or confederacies. The appor- tionment^ in the first instance, and the progressive extinguish- ment, afterward, would be alike productive of ill-humor and animosity. How would it be possible to agree upon a rule of apportionment satisfactory to all? There is scarcely any that can be proposed which is entirely free from real objections. These, as usual, would be exaggerated by the adverse interest of the parties. There are even dissimilar views among the States as to the general principle of discharging the public debt. Some of them, either less impressed with the importance of national credit, or because their citizens have little, if any, im- mediate interest in the question, feel an indifference, if not a repugnance, to the payment of the domestic debt, at any rate. These would be inclined to magnify the difficulties of a distri- bution. Others of them, a numerous body of whose citizens are creditors to the public, beyond the proportion of the State in the total amount of the national debt, would be strenuous for some equitable and effectual provision. The procrastinations of the former would excite the resentments of the latter. The settle- ment of a rule would in the meantime be postponed, by real differences of opinion and affected delays. The citizens of the States interested would clamor; foreign powers would urge for the satisfaction of their just demands; and the peace of the States would be hazarded to the double contingency of exter- nal invasion and internal contention.

Suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule surmounted and the apportionment made. Still there is great room to sup- pose that the rule agreed upon would, upon experiment, be found to bear harder upon some States than upon others. Those which were sufferers by it would naturally seek for a mitigation of the burden. The others would as naturally be disinclined to a revision, which was likely to end in an increase of their own incumbrances. Their refusal would be too plausible a pretext to the complaining States to withhold their contributions, not to be embraced with avidity; and the non-compliance of these States with their engagements would be a ground of bitter dis-

32

THE FEDERALIST

sension and altercation. If even the rule adopted should in practice justify the equality of its principle, still delinquencies in payment on the part of some of the States would result from a diversity of other causes — the real deficiency of resources, the mismanagement of their finances, accidental disorders in the ad- ministration of the government, and, in addition to the rest, the reluctance with which men commonly part with money for pur- poses that have outlived the exigencies which produced them and interfere with the supply of immediate wants. Delinquen- cies, from whatever causes, would be productive of complaints, recriminations, and quarrels. There is perhaps nothing more likely to disturb the tranquillity of nations than their being bound to mutual contributions for any common object which does not yield an equal and coincident benefit. For it is an ob- servation as true as it is trite that there is nothing men dififer so readily about as the payment of money.

Laws in violation of private contracts, as they amount to aggressions on the rights of those States whose citizens are in- jured by them, may be considered as another probable source of hostility. We are not authorized to expect that a more liberal or more equitable spirit would preside over the legislations of the individual States hereafter, if unrestrained by any additional checks, than we have heretofore seen, in too many instances, disgracing their several codes. We have observed the dispo- sition to retaliation excited in Connecticut, in consequence of the enormities perpetrated by the Legislature of Rhode Island ; and we may reasonably infer that in similar cases, under other circumstances, a war, not of parchment, but of the sword, would chastise such atrocious breaches of moral obligation and social justice.

The probability of incompatible alliances between the differ- ent States or confederacies, and different foreign nations, and the effects of this situation upon the peace of the whole, have been sufficiently unfolded in some preceding papers. From the view they have exhibited of this part of the subject, this con- clusion is to be drawn, that America, if not connected at all, or only by the feeble tie of a simple league offensive and defensive, would, by the operation of such opposite and jarring alliances, be gradually entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of Euro- pean politics and wars ; and by the destructive contentions of the

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 33

parts into which she was divided, would be likely to become a prey to the artifices and machinations of powers equally the ene- mies of them all. ''Divide et impcra" must be the motto of every nation that either hates or fears us.

PUBLIUS.

No. VIII

EFFECTS OF INTERNAL WAR

ASSUMING it, therefore, as an established truth that the several States, in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be formed out of the wreck of the general confederacy would be subject to those vicissi- tudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity with each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not united under one government, let us enter into a concise detail of some of the consequences that would attend such a situation. War between the States, in the first periods of their separate existence, would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is in those countries where regular military establishments have long obtained. The disciplined armies al- ways kept on foot on the Continent of Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty and economy, have, notwithstand- ing, been productive of the signal advantage of rendering sud- den conquests impracticable, and of preventing that rapid deso- lation which used to mark the progress of war prior to their introduction. The art of fortification has contributed to the same ends. The nations of Europe are encircled with chains of fortified places, which mutually obstruct invasion. Campaigns are wasted in reducing two or three frontier garrisons, to gain admittance into an enemy's country. Similar impediments oc- cur at every step, to exhaust the strength and delay the progress of an invader. Formerly, an invading army would penetrate into the heart of a neighboring country, almost as soon as intel- ligence of its approach could be received ; but now, a compara- tively small force of disciplined troops, acting on the defensive, with the aid of posts, is able to impede, and finally to frustrate, the enterprises of one much more considerable. The history of

3

34 THE FEDERALIST

war in that quarter of the globe is no longer a history of nations subdued and empires overturned, but of towns taken and re- taken, of battles that decide nothing, of retreats more beneficial than victories, of much effort and little acquisition.

In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy of military establishments would postpone them as long as possible. The want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one State open to another, would facilitate inroads. The populous States would, with little difficulty, overrun their less populous neighbors. Conquests would be as easy to be made as difficult to be retained. War, therefore, would be desultory and predatory. Plunder and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars. The calamities of individuals would make the prin- cipal figure in the events which would characterize our military exploits.

This picture is not too highly wrought, though, I confess, it would not long remain a just one. Safety from external dan- ger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dic- tates. The violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of con- tinual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty, to resort, for repose and security, to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.

The institutions chiefly alluded to are standing armies, and the correspondent appendages of military establishments. Standing armies, it is said, are not provided against in the new Constitution ; and it is therefore inferred that they may exist under it.* Their existence, however, from the very terms of the proposition, is, at most, problematical and uncertain. But standing armies, it may be replied, must inevitably result from a dissolution of the Confederacy. Frequent war and constant apprehension, which require a state of as constant preparation, will infallibly produce them. The weaker States or confedera- cies would first have recourse to them, to put themselves upon

* This objection will be fully examined in its proper place ; and it will be shown that the only natural precaution which could have been taken on this subject has been taken, and a much better one than is to be found in any constitution that has been heretofore Iramed in America, most of which contain no guard at all on this subject.

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 35

an equality with their more potent neighbors. They would en- deavor to supply the inferiority of population and resources, by a more regular and effective system of defence, by disciplined troops, and by fortifications. They would, at the same time, be necessitated to strengthen the executive arm of government ; in doing which, their constitutions would acquire a progressive direction toward monarchy. It is of the nature of war to in- crease the executive at the expense of the legislative authority.

The experiments which have been mentioned would soon give the States or confederacies that made use of them, a superiority over their neighbors. Small States, or States of less natural strength, under vigorous governments, and with the assistance of disciplined armies, have often triumphed over large States, or States of greater natural strength, which have been destitute of these advantages. Neither the pride nor the safety of the more important States or confederacies would permit them long to submit to this mortifying and adventitious superiority. They would quickly resort to means similar to those by which it had been effected, to reinstate themselves in their lost pre-eminence. Thus we shou-ld, in a little time, see established in every part of this country the same engines of despotism which have been the scourge of the Old World. This, at least, would be the natural course of things ; and our reasonings will be the more likely to be just, in proportion as they are accommodated to this standard.

These are not vague inferences drawn from supposed or spec- ulative defects in a constitution, the whole power of which is lodged in the hands of the people, or their representatives and delegates, but they are solid conclusions, drawn from the natural and necessary progress of human affairs.

It may, perhaps, be asked, by way of objection to this, Why did not standing armies spring up out of the contentions which so often distracted the ancient republics of Greece? Different answers, equally satisfactory, may be given to this question. The industrious habits of the people of the present day, absorbed in the pursuits of gain, and devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce, are incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers, which was the true condition of the peo- ple of those republics. The means of revenue, which have been so greatly multiplied by the increase of gold and silver and of the arts of industry, and the science of finance, which is the off-

36 THE FEDERALIST

spring of modern times, concurring with the habits of nations, have produced an entire revolution in the system of war, and have rendered discipHned armies, distinct from the body of the citizens, the inseparable companion of frequent hostility.

There is a wide difference, also^ between military establish- ments in a country seldom exposed by its situation to internal invasions, and in one which is often subject to them and always apprehensive of them. The rulers of the former can have no good pretext, if they are even so inclined, to keep on foot armies so numerous as must of necessity be maintained in the latter. These armies being, in the first case, rarely, if at all, called into activity for interior defence, the people are in no danger of be- ing broken to military subordination. The laws are not accus- tomed to relaxations in favor of military exigencies ; the civil state remains in full vigor, neither corrupted, nor confounded with the principles or propensities of the other state. The small- ness of the army renders the natural strength of the community an overmatch for it ; and the citizens, not habituated to look up to the military power for protection, or to submit to its oppres- sions, neither love nor fear the soldiery : they view them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence in a necessary evil, and stand ready to resist a power which they suppose may be exerted to the prejudice of their rights. The army under such circum- stances may usefully aid the magistrate to suppress a small fac- tion, or an occasional mob, or insurrection ; but it will be unable to enforce encroachments against the united efforts of the great body of the people.

In a country in the predicament last described, the contrary of all this happens. The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to be always prepared to repel it ; its armies must be numerous enough for instant defence. The continual neces- sity for their services enhances the importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of the citizen. The military state becomes elevated above the civil. The inhabitants of territories often the theatre of war, are unavoidably subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those rights ; and by degrees, the people are brought to consider the soldiery not only as their protectors, but as their superiors. The transition from this disposition to that of considering them as masters, is neither remote nor diffi-

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 37

cult : but it is very difficult to prevail upon a people under such impressions, to make a bold or effectual resistance to usurpa- tions supported by the military power.

The Kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first descrip- tion. An insular situation, and a powerful marine, guarding it in a great measure against the possibility of foreign invasion, supersede the necessity of a numerous army within the kingdom. A sufficient force to make head against a sudden descent, till the militia could have time to rally and embody, is all that has been deemed requisite. No motive of national policy has demanded, nor would public opinion have tolerated, a larger number of troops upon its domestic establishment. There has been, for a long time past, little room for the operation of the other causes, which have been enumerated as the consequences of internal war. This peculiar felicity of situation has, in a great degree, contributed to preserve the liberty which that country to this day enjoys, in spite of the prevalent venality and corruption. If, on the contrary, Britain had been situated on the Continent, and had been compelled, as she would have been by that situation, to make her military establishments at home coextensive with those of the other great powers of Europe, she, like them, would in all probability be at this day a victim to the absolute power of a single man. 'Tis possible, though not easy, that the people of that island may be enslaved from other causes ; but it cannot be by the prowess of an army so inconsiderable as that which has been usually kept up within that kingdom.

If we are wise enough to preserve the Union, we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situa- tion. Europe is at a great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to continue too much dispropor- doned in strength, to be able to give us any dangerous annoy- ance. Extensive military establishments cannot, in this posi- tit)n, be necessary to our security. But if we should be dis- united, and the integral parts should either remain separated, or, which is most probable, should be thrown together into two or three confederacies, we should be, in a short course of time, in the predicament of the Continental powers of Eu- rope— our liberties would be a prey to the means of defending ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each other.

This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and weighty.

38 THE FEDERALIST

It deserves the most serious and mature consideration of every prudent and honest man, of whatever party. If such men will make a firm and solemn pause, and meditate dispas- sionately on the importance of this interesting idea; if they will contemplate it, in all its attitudes, and trace it to all its consequences, they will not hesitate to part with trivial objec- tions to a constitution the rejection of which would in all prob- ability put a final period to the Union. The airy phantoms that flit before the distempered imaginations of some of its adversaries would quickly give place to the more substantial forms of dangers, real, certain, and formidable.

PUBLIUS.

No. IX

UNION A SAFEGUARD AGAINST FACTION AND

INSURRECTION

A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against do-

A>^" A^ mestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible to

read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the dis-

Kj tractions with which they were continually agitated, and at

the rapid succession of revolutions, by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration, between the extremes of tyr- anny and anarchy. If they exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived contrasts to the furious storms that are to succeed. If, now and then, intervals of felicity open themselves to view, we behold them with a mixture of regret, arising from the reflection that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of sedi- tion and party rage. If momentary rays of glory break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a transient and fleet- ing brilliancy, they at the same time admonish us to lament that the vices of government should pervert the direction and tarnish the lustre of those bright talents and exalted endow- ments for which the favored soils that produced them have been so justly celebrated.

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 39

From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those re- publics the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against the forms of republican government, but against the very principles of civil liberty. They have decried all free government as inconsistent with the order of society, and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy soph- isms. And, I trust, America will be the broad and solid foun- dation of other edifices^ not less magnificent, which will be equally permanent monuments of their errors.

But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched of republican government were too just copies of the originals from which they were taken. If it had been found impracticable to have devised models of a more perfect struct- ure, the enlightened friends to liberty would have been obliged to abandon the cause of that species of government as inde- fensible. The science of politics, however, like most other sciences, has received great improvement. The efficacy of various principles is now well understood, which were either not known at all or imperfectly known to the ancients. The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and checks; the institu- tion of courts composed of judges holding their offices during good behavior; the representation of the people in the legis- lature, by deputies of their own election — these are either wholly new discoveries or have made their principal progress toward perfection in modern times. They are means, and powerful means, by which the excellences of republican govern- ment may be retained, and its imperfections lessened or avoided. To this catalogue of circumstances that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil government, I shall venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add one more, on a principle which has been made the foundation of an objection to the new Constitution; I mean the enlargement of the orbit within which such systems are to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of a single State or to the con- solidation of several smaller States into one great confederacy. The latter is that which immediately concerns the object under

40 THE FEDERALIST

consideration. It will, however, be of use to examine the principle, in its application to a single State, which shall be attended to in another place.

The utility of a confederacy, as well to suppress faction, and to guard the internal tranquillity of States, as to increase their external force and s^urhyrxis in reality not a new idea. It has been practised lipon, in different countries and ages, and has received Ihe sanction of the most approved writers on the subjects of politics. The opponents of the plan proposed, have, with great assiduity, cited and circulated the observa- tions of Montesquieu on the hasessity of a contracted terri- tory for a republican government. But they seem not to have been apprised of the sentiments of that great man, expressed in another part of his work, nor to have adverted to the con- sequences of the principle, to iwhich they subscribe with such ready acquiescence.

When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for repub- lics, the standards he had in view were of dimensions far short of the limits of almost every one of these States. Neither Vir- ginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, North Caro- lina, nor Georgia can by any means be compared with the models from which he reasoned, and to which the terms of his description apply. If we, therefore, take his ideas on this point as the criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the alterna- tive either of taking refuge at once in the arms of monarchy or of splitting ourselves into an infinity of little, jealous, clash- ing, tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord and the miserable objects of universal pity or contempt. Some of the writers, who have come forward on the other side of the question, seem to have been aware of the dilemma; and have even been bold enough to hint at the division of the larger States as a desirable thing. Such an infatuated policy, such a desperate expedient, might, by the multiplication of petty offices, answer the views of men who possess not qualifications to extend their influence beyond the narrow circles of personal intrigue; but it could never pro- mote the greatness or happiness of the people of America.

Referring the examination of the principle itself to another place, as has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to remark here that in the sense of the author who has been most

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 41

emphatically quoted upon the occasion, It would only dictate a reduction of the size of the more considerable members of the Union ; but would not militate against their being all com- prehended in one confederate government. And this is the true question, in the discussion of which we are at present interested.

So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition to a general Union of the States, that he explic- itly treats of a confederate republic as the expedient for ex- tending the sphere of popular government, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with those of republicanism.

" It is very probable," says he,* " that mankind would have been obliged, at length, to live constantly under the Govern- ment of a single person, had they not contrived a kind of Constitution, that has all the internal advantages of a Repub- lican, together with the external force of a Monarchical Gov- ernment. I mean a Confederate Republic.

" This form of Government is a Convention by which sev- eral smaller States agree to become members of a larger one, which they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of socie- ties, that constitute a new one, capable of increasing by means of new associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power, as to be able to provide for the security of the united body.

" A Republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may support itself without any internal corruptions. The form of this society prevents all manner of inconveniences.

" If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the Confederate States. Were he to have too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that which would still remain free might op- pose him with forces, independent of those which he had usurped, and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation.

" Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the Con- federate States, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The State may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the Confederacy may be dissolved, and the Con- federates preserve their Sovereignty.

♦ •' Spirit of Laws," Vol. I. bk. IX. Chap. I.

43 THE FEDERALIST

" As this Government is composed of small Republics, it en- joys the internal happiness of each; and with respect to its external situation, it is possessed, by means of the Association, of all the advantages of large Monarchies."

I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting passages, because they contain a luminous abridgment of the principal arguments in favor of the Union, and must effectually remove the false impressions, which a misapplication of other parts of the work was calculated to make. They have, at the same time, an intimate connection with the more immediate design of this paper which is, to illustrate the tendency of the Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection.

A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised between a confederacy and a consolidation of the States. The essential characteristic of the first is said to be, the restriction of its authority to the members in their collective capacities, without reaching to the individuals of whom they are com- posed. It is contended that the national council ought to have no concern with any object of internal administration. An ex- act equality of suffrage between the members has also been in- sisted upon as a leading feature of a confederate government. These positions are, in the main, arbitrary ; they are supported neither by principle nor precedent. It has, indeed, happened that governments of this kind have generally operated in the manner which the distinction, taken notice of, supposes to be inherent in their nature ; but there have been in most of them extensive exceptions to the practice, which serve to prove, as far as example will go, that there is no absolute rule on the subject. And it will be clearly shown, in the course of this investigation, that as far as the principle contended for has prevailed, it has been the cause of incurable disorder and im- becility in the government.

The definition of a confederate republic seems simply to be, " an assemblage of societies," or an association of two or more States into one State. The extent, modifications, and objects of the federal authority are mere matters of discretion. So long as the separate organization of the members be not abol- ished ; so long as it exists, by a constitutional necessity, for local purposes; though it should be in perfect subordination to the general authority of the Union, it would still be, in fact and

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 43

in theory, an association of States, or a confederacy. The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the State governments, makes them constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal government.

In the Lycian Confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three *' cities," or republics, the largest were entitled to three votes in the Common Council, those of the middle class to two, and the smallest to one. The Common Council had the appoint- ment of all the judges and magistrates of the respective cities. This was certainly the most delicate species of interference in their internal administration; for if there be anything that seems exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it is the appointment of their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking of this association, says, " Were I to give a model of an excellent confederate republic, it would be that of Lycia." Thus we perceive that the distinctions insisted upon were not within the contemplation of this enlightened civilian; and we shall be led to conclude that they are the novel refinements of an erroneous theory. Publius.

44

THE FEDERALIST

No. X

THE NUMEROUS ADVANTAGES OF THE UNION

J

AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well- "* constructed union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is at- tached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular govern- ments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to lib- erty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable im- provements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired ; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to con- tend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side as was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally ^^ the friends of public and private faith and of public and per- sonal liberty, that our governments are too unstable; that the public...gQadJs-jiisregard£d in Ihe conflicts of rival parties ; and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party, but by the su- perior force of an interested and overbearing majority. How- ever anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foun- dation, the evidence of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments ; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes ; and, particularly, for that prevail- ing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 45

for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the con- tinent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.

By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.

There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.

There are again two methods of removing the causes of fac- tion: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction whai^*-'' » air is to fire, an ailment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his rea- son and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property origi- nate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity, of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different de- grees and kinds of property immediately results ; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respec- tive proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature

46 ^ THE FEDERALIST

of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil societ Y<:^A Year for different opinions concerning religion, concernfnggov^^ment and many other points, as well of spec- ulation fevs of practice ; an attachment to different leaders am- bitiously contending for pre-eminence and power, or to persons of othe^. descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in lurn, divided mankind into par- ties, inflamed them with mutiJal,, animosity, and rendered them much mofe disposed to vex and oppress each other, than to co-operate lor their common good. So.strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no sub- stantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions h^xe been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly pas- sions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property* Those wn^ hold and those who are without property have ever formed ^stinct in- terests in society. Nfhose who are creditors and tl\pse who are debtors fall undei^^a like discrimi|iation. A landed unterest, a manufacturing inter^t, a^mercapdle interest, a moneyed in- terest, with many lesser\interests, grow up of necessity in civ- ilized nations, and divideXthem into different classes/actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulatipin of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of p^^ty and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of tlae government. '

No man is allowed to be a judge Jn his own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judgTsetit and, not improb- ably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay, with greater rea- son, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens ? and what are the differ- ent classes of legislators, but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? — it is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side, and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be,

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 47

themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction, must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures ? are ques- tions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole re- gard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality ; yet there is, per- haps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temp- tation are given to a predominant party, to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the in- ferior number is a shilling saved to their own pockets.

It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests and render them all sub- servient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm; nor, in many cases, can such an ad- justment be made at all, without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the imme- diate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.

The inference to which we are brought is that the causes of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects. ' If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is sup- plied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. ' It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society ; but it will be un- able to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. ' When a majority is included in a faction, the ^■^^ form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good, and private rights, against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popu- lar government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed.' Let me add that it is the great desideratum, by which alone this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recom- mended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.

48 THE FEDERALIST

By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or in- terest in a majority, at the same time, must be prevented; or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together; that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.

From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert results from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democ- racies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention ; have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property, and have in general been as short in. their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a per- fect equality in their political rights, they would at the same time be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.

A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different pros- pect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the union.

The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are : First, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 49

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to re- fine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regula- tion, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or ex- tensive republics are most favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations.

In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few ; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the constituents, and being proportionally greatest in the small republic, it follows that if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.

In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practise with success the vicious arts, by which elections are too often carried ; and the suffrages of the people, being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established charac- ters.

It must be confessed that in this as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you ren- der the representative too little acquainted with all their local 4

5o THE FEDERALIST

circumstances and lesser interests ; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The fed- eral Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State, legislatures.

The other point of difference is, the greater number of citi- zens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government ; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious com- binations less to be dreaded in the former, than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the dis- tinct parties and interests composing it ; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party ; and the smaller the number of indi- viduals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they con- cert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests ; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens ; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be re- marked that where there is a consciousness of unjust or dis- honorable purposes, communication is always checked by dis- trust, in proportion to the number whose concurrence is neces- sary.

Hence it clearly appears that the same advantage which a re- public has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of fac- tion, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic — is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives, whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices, and to schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to pos- sess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 51

parties, comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority ? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.

The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the confederacy ; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it ; in the same pro- portion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district than an entire State.

In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of federalists. Publius.

52

THE FEDERALIST

No. XI

UTILITY OF THE UNION IN RESPECT TO COMMERCE AND A NAVY

THE importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of those points about which there is least room to entertain a difference of opinion, and which has in fact commanded the most general assent of men who have any acquaintance with the subject. This applies as well to our in- tercourse with foreign countries as with each other.

There are appearances to authorize a supposition that the adventurous spirit, which distinguishes the commercial charac- ter of America, has already excited uneasy sensations in sev- eral of the maritime powers of Europe. They seem to be appre- hensive of our too great interference in that carrying trade which is the support of their navigation and the foundation of their naval strength. Those of them which have colonies in America look forward to what this country is capable of be- coming, with painful solicitude. They foresee the dangers that may threaten their American dominions from the neighbor- hood of States, which have all the dispositions, and would pos- sess all the means, requisite to the creation of a powerful marine. Impressions of this kind will naturally indicate the policy of fostering divisions among us, and of depriving us, as far as possible, of an active commerce in our own bottoms. This would answer the threefold purpose of preventing our interference in their navigation, of monopolizing the profits of our trade, and of clipping the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness. Did not prudence forbid the detail, it would not be difficult to trace, by facts, the workings of this policy to the cabinets of ministers.

If we continue united, we may counteract a policy so un- friendly to our prosperity in a variety of ways. By prohib- itory regulations, extending, at the same time throughout the States, we may oblige foreign countries to bid against each other for the privilege of our markets. This assertion will not appear chimerical to those who are able to appreciate the im- portance of the markets of 3,000,000 of people — increasing

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 53

in rapid progression, for the most part exclusively addicted to agriculture, and likely from local circumstances to remain so — to any manufacturing nation; and the immense difference there would be to the trade and navigation of such a nation, between a direct communication in its own ships, and an in- direct conveyance of its products and returns, to and from America, in the ships of another country. Suppose, for in- stance, we had a government in America capable of excluding Great Britain (with whom we have at present no treaty of com- merce) from all our ports; what would be the probable opera- tion of this step upon her politics? Would it not enable us to negotiate, with the fairest prospect of success, for commercial privileges of the most valuable and extensive kind, in the do- minions of that kingdom? When these questions have been asked upon other occasions they have received a plausible but not a solid or satisfactory answer. It has been said that pro- hibitions on our part would produce no change in the system of Britain; because she could prosecute her trade with us, through the medium of the Dutch, who would be her immedi- ate customers and paymasters for those articles which were wanted for the supply of our markets. But would not her navigation be materially injured, by the loss of the important advantage of being her own carrier in that trade? Would not the principal part of its profits be intercepted by the Dutch, as a compensation for their agency and risk? Would not the mere circumstance of freight occasion a considerable deduc- tion? Would not so circuitous an intercourse facilitate the competitions of other nations, by enhancing the price of British commodities in our markets, and by transferring to other hands the management of this interesting branch of the British com- merce?

A mature consideration of the objects suggested by these questions will justify a belief, that the real disadvantages to Britain, from such a state of things, conspiring with the pre- possessions of a great part of the nation in favor of the Amer- ican trade, and with the importunities of the West India islands, would produce a relaxation in her present system, and would let us into the enjoyment of privileges in the markets of those islands and elsewhere, from which our trade would derive the most substantial benefits. Such a point gained from the Brit-

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ish Government, and which could not be expected without an equivalent in exemptions and immunities in our markets, would be likely to have a correspondent effect on the conduct of other nations, who would not be inclined to see themselves altogether supplanted in our trade.

A further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations toward us, in this respect, would arise from the estab- lishment of a federal navy. There can be no doubt that the continuance of the Union, under an efficient government, would put it in our power, at a period not very distant, to create a navy, which, if it could not vie with those of the great maritime powers, would at least be of respectable weight, if thrown into the scale of either of two contending parties. This would be more peculiarly the case, in relation to operations in the West Indies. A few ships of the line, sent opportunely to the rein- forcement of either side, would often be sufficient to decide the fate of a campaign, on the event of which interests of the great- est magnitude were suspended. Our position is, in this re- spect, a very commanding one. And if, to this consideration, we add that of the usefulness of supplies from this country, in the prosecution of military operations in the West Indies, it will readily be perceived, that a situation so favorable would enable us to bargain with great advantage for commercial privileges, A price would be set, not only upon our friendship, but upon our neutrality. By a steady adherence to the Union, we may hope, erelong, to become the arbiter of Europe in America; and to be able to incline the balance of European competitions in this part of the world, as our interest may dictate.

But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall discover, that the rivalships of the parts would make them checks upon each other and would frustrate all the tempting advantages which nature has kindly placed within our reach. In a state so insignificant, our commerce would be a prey to the wanton intermeddlings of all nations at war with each other; who, hav- ing nothing to fear from us, would, with little scruple or re- morse, supply their wants by depredations on our property, as often as it fell in their way. The rights of neutrality will only be respected, when they are defended by an adequate power. A nation, despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the privilege of being neutral.

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 55

Under a vigorous national government, the natural strength and resources of the country, directed to a common interest, would baffle all the combinations of European jealousy to re- strain our growth. This situation would even take away the motive to such combinations, by inducing an impracticability of success. An active commerce, an extensive navigation, and a flourishing marine would then be the inevitable offspring of moral and physical necessity. We might defy the little arts of little politicians to control, or vary, the irresistible and un- changeable course of nature.

But in a state of disunion, these combinations might exist and might operate with success. It would be in the power of the maritime nations, availing themselves of our universal im- potence, to prescribe the conditions of our political existence; and as they have a common interest in being our carriers, and still more in preventing our becoming theirs, they would, in all probability combine to embarrass our navigation in such a man- ner as would in effect destroy it, and confine us to a passive commerce. We should thus be compelled to content ourselves with the first price of our commodities, and to see the profits of our trade snatched from us, to enrich our enemies and per- secutors. That unequalled spirit of enterprise which signalizes the genius of the American merchants and navigators, and which is in itself an inexhaustible mine of national wealth, would be stifled and lost; and poverty and disgrace would overspread a country, which, with wisdom, might make herself the ad- miration and envy of the world.

There are rights of great moment to the trade of America, which are rights of the Union — I allude to the fisheries, to the navigation of the Western lakes, and to that of the Mississippi. The dissolution of the confederacy would give room for deli- cate questions, concerning the future existence of these rights; which the interest of more powerful partners would hardly fail to solve to our disadvantage. The disposition of Spain, with regard to the Mississippi, needs no comment. France and Britain are concerned with us in the fisheries, and view them as of the utmost moment to their navigation. They, of course, would hardly remain long indifferent to that decided mastery, of which experience has shown us to be possessed, in this valu- able branch of traffic; and by which we are able to undersell

56 THE FEDERALIST

those nations in their own markets. What more natural than that they should be disposed to exclude from the lists such dangerous competitors?

This branch of trade ought not to be considered as a partial benefit. All the navigating States may, in different degrees, advantageously participate in it, and under circumstances of a greater extension of mercantile capital would not be unlikely to do it. As a nursery of seamen, it now is, or, when time shall have more nearly assimilated the principles of navigation in the several States, will become a universal resource. To the establishment of a navy, it must be indispensable.

To this great national object, a navy. Union will contribute in various ways. Every institution will grow and flourish in proportion to the quantity and extent of the means concentred toward its formation and support. A navy of the United States, as it would embrace the resources of all, is an object far less remote than a navy of any single State or partial confed- eracy, which would only embrace the resources of a part. It happens, indeed, that different portions of confederated America possess each some peculiar advantage for this essential estab- lishment. The more Southern States furnish, in greater abun- dance, certain kinds of naval stores — tar, pitch, and turpentine. Their wood, for the construction of ships, is also of a more solid and lasting texture. The difference in the duration of the ships of which the navy might be composed, if chiefly con- structed of Southern wood, would be of signal importance, either in the view of naval strength or of national economy. Some of the Southern and of the Middle States yield a greater plenty of iron, and of better quality. Seamen must chiefiy be drawn from the Northern hive. The necessity of naval pro- tection to external or maritime commerce, does not require a particular elucidation, no more than the conduciveness of that species of commerce to the prosperity of a navy. They, by a kind of reaction, mutually beneficial, promote each other.

An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance the trade of each, by an interchange of their re- spective productions, not only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, but for exportation to foreign markets. The veins of commerce in every part will be replenished, and will acquire additional motion and vigor from a free circulation of the com-

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 57

modities of every part. Commercial enterprise will have much greater scope, from the diversity in the productions of differ- ent States. When the staple of one fails, from a bad harvest or unproductive crop, it can call to its aid the staple of another. The variety, not less than the value of products for exporta- tion, contributes to the activity of foreign commerce. It can be conducted upon much better terms, with a large number of materials of a given value, than with a small number of mate- rials of the same value; arising from the competitions of trade and from the fluctuations of markets. Particular articles may be in great demand at certain periods, and unsalable at others; but if there be a variety of articles, it can scarcely happen that they should all be at one time in the latter predicament; and on this account the operations of the merchant would be less liable to any considerable obstruction or stagnation. The speculative trader will at once perceive the force of these ob- servations, and will acknowledge that the aggregate balance of the commerce of the United States would bid fair to be much more favorable than that of the Thirteen States without union or with partial unions.

It may, perhaps, be replied to this that whether the States are united or disunited there would still be an intimate inter- course between them, which would answer the same ends; but this intercourse would be fettered, interrupted, and narrowed by a multiplicity of causes, which in the course of these papers have been amply detailed. A unity of commercial as well as political interests can only result from a unity of government.

There are other points of view in which this subject might be placed, of a striking and animating kind. But they would lead us too far into the regions of futurity, and would involve topics not proper for a newspaper discussion. I shall briefly observe that our situation invites and our interests prompt us to aim at an ascendant in the system of American affairs. The world may politically as well as geographically be divided into four parts, each having a distinct set of interests. Unhappily for the other three, Europe, by her arms and by her negotia- tions, by force and by fraud, has, in different degrees, extended her dominion over them all. Africa, Asia, and America have successively felt her domination. The superiority she has long maintained has tempted her to plume herself as the mistress

58 THE FEDERALIST

of the world, and to consider the rest of mankind as created for her benefit. Men, admired as profound philosophers, have in direct terms attributed to her inhabitants a physical superiority, and have gravely asserted that all animals, and with them the human species, degenerate in America — that even dogs cease to bark, after having breathed awhile in our atmosphere.* Facts have too long supported these arrogant pretensions of the European. It belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother moderation. Union will enable us to do it. Disunion will add another vic- tim to his triumphs. Let Americans disdain to be the instru- ments of European greatness! Let the Thirteen States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one great American system, superior to the control of all trans- Atlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection between the Old and the New World!

PUBLIUS.

No. XII

THE UNION IN RESPECT TO REVENUE

THE effects of Union upon the commercial prosperity of the States have been sufficiently delineated. Its ten- dency to promote the interests of revenue will be the subject of our present inquiry.

The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowl- edged, by all enlightened statesmen, to be the most useful as well as the most productive source of national wealth, and has accordingly become a primary object of their political cares. By multiplying the means of gratification, by promoting the introduction and circulation of the precious metals, those dar- ling objects of human avarice and enterprise, it serves to vivify and invigorate the channels of industry and to make them flow with greater activity and copiousness. The assiduous mer- chant, the laborious husbandman, the active mechanic, and the industrious manufacturer, all orders of men, look forward with eager expectation and growing alacrity to this pleasing reward

* '■'' Recherches philosophiques sur les Amiricains,"

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 59

of their toils. The often agitated question between agriculture and commerce has, from indubitable experience, received a de- cision, which has silenced the rivalships that once subsisted between them, and has proved, to the satisfaction of their friends, that their interests are intimately blended and inter- wo'^/en. It has been found, in various countries, that in pro- portion as commerce has flourished, land has risen in value. And how could it have happened otherwise? Could that which procures a freer vent for the products of the earth; which fur- nishes new incitements to the cultivators of land; which is the most powerful instrument in increasing the quantity of money in a State — could that, in fine, which is the faithful handmaid of labor and industry, in every shape, fail to augment the value of that article, which is the prolific parent of far the greatest part of the objects upon which they are exerted? It is aston- ishing that so simple a truth should ever have had an adver- sary; and it is one, among a multitude of proofs, how apt a spirit of ill-informed jealousy, or of too great abstraction and refinement, is to lead men astray from the plainest paths of reason and conviction.

The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be propor- tioned, in a great degree, to the quantity of money in circula- tion and to the celerity with which it circulates. Commerce, contributing to both these objects, must of necessity render the payment of taxes easier and facilitate the requisite supplies to the Treasury. The hereditary dominions of the Emperor of Germany contain a great extent of fertile, cultivated, and popu- lous territory, a large proportion of which is situated in mild and luxuriant climates. In some parts of this territory are to be found the best gold and silver mines in Europe. And yet, from the want of the fostering influence of commerce, that mon- arch can boast but slender revenues. He has several times been compelled to owe obligations to the pecuniary succors of other nations, for the preservation of his essential interests; and is unable, upon the strength of his own resources, to sustain a long or continued war.

But it is not in this aspect of the subject alone that Union will be seen to conduce to the purposes of revenue. There are other points of view in which its influence will appear more immediate and decisive. It is evident from the state of the

6o THE FEDERALIST

country, from the habits of the people, from the experience we have had on the point itself, that it is impracticable to raise any very considerable sums by direct taxation. Tax laws have in vain been multiplied; new methods to enforce the collection have in vain been tried; the public expectation has been uni- formly disappointed, and the treasuries of the States have re- mained empty. The popular system of administration, inher- ent in the nature of popular government, coinciding with the real scarcity of money, incident to a languid and mutilated state of trade, has hitherto defeated every experiment for extensive collections, and has at length taught the different legislatures the folly of attempting them.

No person, acquainted with what happens in other coun- tries, will be surprised at this circumstance. In so opulent a nation as that of Britain, where direct taxes, from superior wealth, must be much more tolerable, and, from the vigor of the government, much more practicable, than in America, far the greatest part of the national revenue is derived from taxes of the indirect kind, from imposts, and from excises. Duties on imported articles form a large branch of this latter descrip- tion.

In America it is evident that we must a long time depend, for the means of revenue, chiefly on such duties. In most parts of it, excises must be confined within a narrow compass. The genius of the people will ill brook the inquisitive and peremp- tory spirit of excise laws. The pockets of the farmers, on the other hand, will reluctantly yield but scanty supplies, in the unwelcome shape of impositions on their houses and lands; and personal property is too precarious and invisible a fund to be laid hold of in any other way than by the imperceptible agency of taxes on consumption.

If these remarks have any foundation, that state of things which will best enable us to improve and extend so valuable a resource must be best adapted to our political welfare. And it cannot admit of a serious doubt that this state of things must rest on the basis of a general Union. As far as this would be conducive to the interests of commerce, so far it must tend to the extension of the revenue to be drawn from that source. As far as it would contribute to rendering regulations for the collection of the duties more simple and efficacious, so far it

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 6i

must serve to answer the purposes of making the same rate of duties more productive, and of putting it into the power of the government to increase the rate without prejudice to trade.

The relative situation of these States; the number of rivers with which they are intersected, and of bays that wash their shores; the faciHty of communication in every direction; the affinity of language and manners; the familiar habits of inter- course; all these are circumstances that would conspire to ren- der an illicit trade between them a matter of little difficulty; and would insure frequent evasions of the commercial regulations of each other. The separate States, or confederacies, would be necessitated by mutual jealousy to avoid the temptations to that kind of trade, by the lowness of their duties. The temper of our governments, for a long time to come, would not permit those rigorous precautions, by which the European nations guard the avenues into their respective countries, as well by land as by water; and which, even there, are found insufficient obstacles to the adventurous stratagems of avarice.

In France there is an army of patrols (as they are called) constantly employed to secure their fiscal regulations against the inroads of the dealers in contraband trade. Mr. Necker computes the number of these patrols at upward of 20,000. This shows the immense difficulty in preventing that species of traffic, where there is an inland communication, and places in a strong light the disadvantages, with which the collection of duties in this country would be encumbered, if by disunion the States should be placed in a situation, with respect to each other, resembling that of France with respect to her neighbors. The arbitrary and vexatious powers with which the patrols are necessarily armed would be intolerable in a free country.

If, on the contrary, there be but one government pervading all the States, there will be, as to the principal part of our com- merce, but one side to guard — the Atlantic coast. Vessels arriving directly from foreign countries, laden with valuable cargoes, would rarely choose to hazard themselves to the compli- cated and critical perils which would attend attempts to unlade prior to their coming into port. They would have to dread both the dangers of the coast and of detection, as well after as before their arrival at the places of their final destination. An ordinary degree of vigilance v/ould be competent to the preven-

62 THE FEDERALIST

tion of any material infractions upon the rights of the revenue. A few armed vessels, judiciously stationed at the entrances of our ports, might at a small expense be made useful sentinels of the laws. And the government having the same interest to pro- vide against violations everywhere, the co-operation of its meas- ures in each State would have a powerful tendency to render them effectual. Here also we should preserve, by union, an ad- vantage which nature holds out to us, and which would be relin- quished by separation. The United States lie at a great distance from Europe, and at a considerable distance from all other places with which they would have extensive connections of foreign trade. The passage from them to us, in a few hours, or in a single night, as between the coasts of France and Britain, and of other neighboring nations, would be impracticable. This is a prodigious security against a direct contraband with foreign countries; but a circuitous contraband to one State, through the medium of another, would be both easy and safe. The dif- ference between a direct importation from abroad, and an indi- rect importation through the channel of a neighboring State, in small parcels, according to time and opportunity, with the addi- tional facilities of inland communication, must be palpable to every man of discernment.

It is, therefore, evident that one national government would be able, at much less expense, to extend the duties on imports, beyond comparison, further than would be practicable to the States separately, or to any partial confederacies. Hitherto, I believe, it may safely be asserted that these duties have not upon an average exceeded in any State three per cent. In France they are estimated to be about fifteen per cent., and in Britain they exceed this proportion.* There seems to be nothing to hinder their being increased in this country, to at least treble their present amount. The single article of ardent spirits, under federal regulation, might be made to furnish a considerable rev- enue. Upon a ratio to the importation into this State, the whole quantity imported into the United States may be estimated at 4,000,000 of gallons ; which, at a shilling per gallon, would pro- duce i200,ooo. That article would well bear this rate of duty ; and if it should tend to diminish the consumption of it, such an effect would be equally favorable to the agriculture, to the econ-

* If my memory be right they amount to twenty per cent.

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 63

omy, to the morals, and to the health of the society. There is, perhaps, nothing so much a subject of national extravagance as these spirits.

What will be the consequence, if we are not able to avail our- selves of the resource in question in its full extent? A nation cannot long exist without revenues. Destitute of this essential support, it must resign its independence, and sink into the de- graded condition of a province. This is an extremity to which no government will of choice accede. Revenue, therefore, must be had at all events. In this country, if the principal part be not drawn from commerce, it must fall with oppressive weight upon land. It has been already intimated that excises, in their true signification, are too little in unison with the feelings of the people, to admit of great use being made of that mode of taxa- tion; nor, indeed, in the States where almost the sole employ- ment is agriculture, are the objects, proper for excise, sufficiently numerous to permit very ample collections in that way. Per- sonal estate (as has been before remarked), from the difficulty of tracing it, cannot be subjected to large contributions, by any other means than by taxes on consumption. In popular cities, it may be enough the subject of conjecture, to occasion the op- pression of individuals, without much aggregate benefit to the State ; but beyond these circles, it must, in a great measure, es- cape the eye and the hand of the tax-gatherer. As the necessi- ties of the State, nevertheless, must be satisfied in some mode or other, the defect of other resources must throw the principal weight of the public burdens on the possessors of land. And as, on the other hand, the wants of the government can never obtain an adequate supply, unless all the sources of revenue are open to its demands, the finances of the community, under such embarrassments, cannot be put into a situation consistent with its respectability or its security. Thus we shall not even have the consolations of a full treasury, to atone for the oppression of that valuable class of the citizens, who are employed in the cultivation of the soil. But public and private distress will keep pace with each other in gloomy concert, and unite in de- ploring the infatuation of those counsels which led to disunion.

PUBLIUS.

64 THE FEDERALIST

No. XIII

THE UNION AND ECONOMY IN REVENUE

AS connected with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety consider that of economy. The money saved from one object may be usefully applied to another ; and there will be so much the less to be drawn from the pockets of the people. If the States are united under one government, there will be but one national civil-list to support; if they are divided into several confederacies, there will be as many different nation- al civil-lists to be provided for, and each of them, as to the princi- pal departments, coextensive with that which would be neces- sary for a government of the whole. The entire separation of the States into thirteen unconnected sovereignties is a project too extravagant, and too replete with danger, to have many ad- vocates. The ideas of men who speculate upon the dismember- ment of the empire, seem generally turned toward three confed- eracies ; one consisting of the four Northern, another of the four Middle, and a third of the five Southern States. There is little probability that there would be a greater number. According to this distribution, each confederacy would comprise an extent of territory larger than that of the Kingdom of Great Britain. No well-informed man will suppose that the affairs of such a confederacy can be properly regulated by a government less comprehensive in its organs or institutions than that which has been proposed by the Convention. When the dimensions of a State attain to a certain magnitude, it requires the same energy of government, and the same forms of administration, which are requisite in one of much greater extent. This idea admits not of precise demonstration, because there is no rule by which we can measure the momentum of civil power, necessary to the government of any given number of individuals ; but when we consider that the island of Britain^ nearly commensurate with each of the supposed confederacies, contains about 8,000,000 of people, and when we reflect upon the degree of authority required to direct the passions of so large a society to the public good, we shall see no reason to doubt, that the like portion of power would be sufficient to perform the same task in a society

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 65

far more numerous. Civil power, properly organized and ex- erted, is capable of diffusing its force to a very great extent ; and can, in a manner, reproduce itself in every part of a great empire, by a Judicious arrangement of subordinate institutions.

The supposition, that each confederacy into which the States would be likely to be divided would require a government not less comprehensive than the one proposed, will be strengthened by another supposition, more probable than that which presents us with three confederacies, as the alternative to a general Union. If we attend carefully to geographical and commercial considerations, in conjunction with the habits and prejudices of the different States, we shall be led to conclude that in case of disunion they will most naturally league themselves under two governments. The four Eastern States, from all the causes that form the links of national sympathy and connection, may with certainty be expected to unite. New York, situated as she is, would never be unwise enough to oppose a feeble and unsup- ported flank to the weight of that confederacy. There are obvi- ous reasons, that would facilitate her accession to it. New Jer- sey is too small a State to think of being a frontier, in opposition to this still more powerful combination ; nor do there appear to be any obstacles to her admission into it. Even Pennsylvania would have strong inducements to join the Northern league. "An active foreign commerce, on the basis of her own naviga- tion, is her true policy, and coincides with the opinions and dis- positions of her citizens. The more Southern States, from various circumstances, may not think themselves much inter- ested in the encouragement of navigation. They may prefer a system, which would give unlimited scope to all nations, to be the carriers, as well as the purchasers, of their commodities. Pennsylvania may not choose to confound her interests in a con- nection so adverse to her policy. As she must, at all events, be a frontier, she may deem it most consistent with her safety to have her exposed side turned toward the weaker power of the Southern, rather than toward the stronger power of the Northern confederacy. This would give her the fairest chance to avoid being the Flanders of America. Whatever may be the determination of Pennsylvania, if the Northern confederacy includes New Jersey, there is no likelihood of more than one confederacy to the south of that State. 5

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THE FEDERALIST

Nothing can be more evident than that the Thirteen States will be able to support a national government better than one- half or one-third or any number less than the whole. This reflection must have great weight in obviating that objection to the proposed plan, which is founded on the principle of expense ; an objection, however, which, when we come to take a nearer view of it, will appear in every light to stand on mistaken ground.

If, in addition to the consideration of a plurality of civil-lists, we take into view the number of persons who must necessarily be employed to guard the inland communication between the different confederacies against illicit trade, and who in time will infallibly spring up out of the necessities of revenue ; and if we also take into view the military establishments which it has been shown would unavoidably result from the jealousies and con- flicts of the several nations into which the States would be divid- ed, we shall clearly discover that a separation would be not less injurious to the economy than to the tranquillity, commerce, revenue, and liberty of every part. Publius.

No. XIV

EXTENT OF THE COUNTRY NO OBJECTION TO

THE UNION

WE have seen the necessity of the Union as our bulwark against foreign danger, as the conservator of peace among ourselves, as the guardian of our commerce and other common interests, as the only substitute for those mili- tary establishments which have subverted the liberties of the Old World, and as the proper antidote for the diseases of fac- tion, which have proved fatal to other popular governments, and of which alarming symptoms have been betrayed by our own. All that remains, within this branch of our inquiries, is to take notice of an objection that may be drawn from the great extent of country which the Union embraces. A few observa- tions on this subject will be the more proper, as it is perceived that the adversaries of the new Constitution are availing them- selves of a prevailing prejudice, with regard to the practicable

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 67

sphere of republican administration, in order to supply, by im- aginary difficulties, the want of those solid objections, which they endeavor in vain to find.

The error which limits republican government to a narrow district has been unfolded and refuted in preceding papers. I remark here only that it seems to owe its rise and prevalence chiefly to the confounding of a republic with a democracy, and applying to the former reasonings drawn from the nature of the latter. The true distinction between these forms was also ad- verted to on a former occasion. It is that in a democracy the people meet and exercise the government in person ; in a repub- lic they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. A democracy, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended over a large region.

To this accidental source of the error may be added the arti- fice of some celebrated authors, whose writings have had a great share in forming the modern standard of political opinions. Being subjects either of an absolute or limited monarchy, they have endeavored to heighten the advantages, or palliate the evils, of those forms, by placing in comparison with them the vices and defects of the republican, and by citing as specimens of the latter the turbulent democracies of ancient Greece and modern Italy. Under the confusion of names, it has been an easy task to transfer to a republic observations applicable to a democracy only ; and among others, the observation that it can never be established but among a small number of people, living within a small compass of territory.

Such a fallacy may have been the less perceived, as most of the popular governments of antiquity were of the democratic species ; and even in modern Europe, to which we owe the great principle of representation, no example is seen of a government wholly popular, and founded, at the same time, wholly on that principle. If Europe has the merit of discovering this great mechanical power in government, by the simple agency of which the will of the largest political body may be concentred and its force directed to any object which the public good re- quires, America can claim the merit of making the discovery the basis of unmixed and extensive republics. It is only to be lamented that any of her citizens should wish to deprive her of the additional merit of displaying its full efficacy in the estab-

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lishment of the comprehensive system now under her consid- eration.

As the natural Hmit of a democracy is that distance from the central point which will just permit the most remote citizens to assemble as often as their public functions demand, and will in- clude no greater number than can join in those functions; so the natural limit of a republic is that distance from the centre which will barely allow the representatives of the people to meet as often as may be necessary for the administration of public affairs. Can it be said that the limits of the United States ex- ceed this distance ? It will not be said by those who recollect that the Atlantic Coast is the longest side of the Union ; that during the term of thirteen years, the representatives of the States have been almost continually assembled ; and that the members from the most distant States are not chargeable with greater intermis- sions of attendance than those from the States in the neighbor- hood of Congress.

That we may form a juster estimate with regard to this inter- esting subject, let us resort to the actual dimensions of the Union. The limits, as fixed by the treaty of peace, are, on the east the Atlantic, on the south the latitude of thirty-one degrees, on the west the Mississippi, and on the north an irregular line running in some instances beyond the forty-fifth degree, in others falling as low as the forty-second. The southern shore of Lake Erie lies below that latitude. Computing the distance between the thirty-first and forty-fifth degrees, it amounts to 973 common miles ; computing it from thirty-one to forty-two degrees, to 764^ miles. Taking the mean for the distance, the amount will be 868^ miles. The mean distance from the Atlantic to the Mississippi does not probably exceed 750 miles. On a comparison of this extent with that of several countries in Europe, the practicability of rendering our system commensu- rate to it appears to demonstrable. It is not a great deal larger than Germany, where a Diet, representing the whole empire, is continually assembled ; or than Poland before the late dismem- berment, where another national Diet was the depositary of the supreme power. Passing by France and Spain, we find that in Great Britain, inferior as it may be in size, the representatives of the northern extremity of the island have as far to travel to the national coimcil as will be required of those of the most remote parts of the Union.

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Favorable as this view of the subject may be, some observa- tions remain, which will place it in a light still more satisfactory.

In the first place it is to be remembered that the general gov- ernment is not to be charged with the whole power of making and administering laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern all the members of the re- public, but which are not to be attained by the separate provis- ions of any. The subordinate governments, which can extend their care to all those other objects which can be separately provided for, will retain their due authority and activity. Were it proposed by the plan of the Convention to abolish the govern- ments of the particular States, its adversaries would have some ground for their objection; though it would not be difficult to show, that if they were abolished, the general government would be compelled, by the principle of self-preservation, to reinstate them in their proper jurisdiction.

A second observation to be made is that the immediate objects of the federal Constitution is to secure the union of the Thirteen Primitive States, which we know to be practicable ; and to add to them such other States as may arise in their own bosoms, or in their neighborhoods, which we cannot doubt to be equally practicable. The arrangements that may be necessary for those angles and fractions of our territory which lie on our north- western frontier, must be left to those whom further discoveries and experience will render more equal to the task.

Let it be remarked, in the third place, that the intercourse throughout the Union will be daily facilitated by new improve- ments. Roads will everywhere be shortened, and kept in better order; accommodations for travellers will be multiplied and meliorated; an interior navigation on our eastern side will be opened throughout, or nearly throughout, the whole extent of the Thirteen States. The communication between the western and Atlantic districts, and between different parts of each, will be rendered more and more easy, by those numerous canals with .which the beneficence of nature has intersected our country, and which art finds it so little difficult to connect and complete.

A fourth, and still more important consideration, is that as almost every State will, on one side or other, be a frontier, and will thus find, in a regard to its safety, an inducement to make, some sacrifices for the sake of the general protection; so thei

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States which lie at the greatest distance from the heart of the Union, and which of course may partake least of the ordinary circulation of its benefits, will be at the same time immediately contiguous to foreign nations, and will consequently stand, on particular occasions, in greatest need of its strength and re- sources. It may be inconvenient for Georgia, or the States form- ing our western or northeastern borders, to send their repre- sentatives to the seat of government ; but they would find it more so to struggle along against an invading enemy, or even to sup- port alone the whole expense of those precautions which may be dictated by the neighborhood of continual danger. If they should derive less benefit, therefore, from the Union in some respects, than the less distant States, they will derive greater benefit from it in other respects, and thus the proper equilibrium will be maintained throughout.

I submit to you, my fellow-citizens, these considerations, in full confidence that the good-sense which has so often marked your decisions will allow them their due weight and effect ; and that you will never suffer difficulties, however formidable in appearance or however fashionable the error on which they may be founded, to drive you into the gloomy and perilous scene into which the advocates for disunion would conduct you. Hearken not to the unnatural voice, which tells you that the people of America, knit together as they are by so many cords of affection, can no longer live together as members of the same family ; can no longer continue the mutual guardians of their mutual happi- ness ; can no longer be fellow-citizens of one great, respectable, and flourishing empire. Hearken not to the voice which petu- lantly tells you that the form of government recommended for your adoption is a novelty in the political world; that is has never yet had a place in the theories of the wildest projectors ; that it rashly attempts what it is impossible to accomplish. No, my countrymen, shut your ears against this unhallowed lan- guage. Shut your hearts against the poison which it conveys ; the kindred blood which flows in the veins of American citizens, the mingled blood which they have shed in defence of their sacred rights, consecrate their Union, and excite horror at the idea of their becoming aliens, rivals, enemies. And if novelties are to be shunned, believe me, the most alarming of all novel- ties, the most wild of all projects^ the most rash of all attempts,

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is that of rending us in pieces in order to preserve our liberties and promote our happiness. But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected, merely because it may com- prise what is new ? Is it not the glory of the people of America, that while they have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names to overrule the suggestions of their own good-sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience? To this manly spirit, posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the world for the example^ of the numerous innovations displayed on the American theatre, in favor of private rights and public happiness. Had no important step been taken by the leaders of the Revolution for which a precedent could not be discovered, no government established of which an exact model did not present itself, the people of the United States might, at this moment, have been numbered among the melancholy vic- tims of misguided councils, must at best have been laboring under the weight of some of those forms which have crushed the liberties of the rest of mankind. Happily for America, hap- pily we trust for the whole human race, they pursued a new and more noble course. They accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the annals of human society. They reared the fabrics of governments which have no model on the face of the globe. They formed the design of a great confederacy which it is incumbent on their successors to improve and perpetuate. If their works betray imperfections, we wonder at the fewness of them. If they erred most in the structure of the Union, this was the work most difficult to be executed ; this is the work which has been new-modelled by the act of your Convention, and it is that act on which you are now to deliberate and to decide. Publius.

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No. XV

LEGISLATIVE DEFECTS OF THE CONFED- ERATION

IN the course of the preceding papers I have endeavored^ my fellow-citizens, to place before you, in a clear and convinc- ing light, the importance of Union to your political safety and happiness. I have unfolded to you a complication of dan- gers to which you would be exposed, should you permit that sacred knot which binds the people of America together to be severed or dissolved by ambition or by avarice, by jealousy or by misrepresentation. In the sequel of the inquiry through which I propose to accompany you, the truths intended to be inculcated will receive further confirmation from facts and argu- ments hitherto unnoticed. If the road, over which you will still have to pass, should in some places appear to you tedious or irksome, you will recollect that you are in quest of informa- tion on a subject the most momentous which can engage the attention of a free people ; that the field through which you have to travel is in itself spacious, and that the difficulties of the jour- ney have been unnecessarily increased by the mazes with which sophistry has beset the way. It will be my aim to remove the obstacles to your progress, in as compendious a manner as it can be done, without sacrificing utility to despatch.

In pursuance of the plan which I have laid down, for the dis- cussion of the subject, the point next in order to be examined is the " insufficiency of the present confederation to the preser- vation of the Union." It may perhaps be asked, what need there is of reasoning or proof to illustrate a position which is not either controverted or doubted ; to which the understandings and feelings of all classes of men assent, and which in substance is admitted by the opponents as well as by the friends of the new Constitution ? It must in truth be acknowledged that, however these may differ in other respects, they in general appear to har- monize in this sentiment, at least, that there are material imper- fections in our national system, and that something is necessary to be done to rescue us from impending anarchy. The facts that support this opinion are no longer objects of speculation.

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They have forced themselves upon the sensibihty of the people at large, and have at length extorted from those, whose mis- taken policy has had the principal share in precipitating the ex- tremity at which we are arrived, a reluctant confession of the reality of those defects in the scheme of our federal government which have been long pointed out and regretted by the intelli- gent friends of the Union.

We may, indeed, with propriety, be said to have reached al- most the last stage of national humiliation. There is scarcely anything that can wound the pride, or degrade the character of an independent nation, which we do not experience. Are there engagements, to the performance of which wc are held by every tie respectable among men? These are the subjects of constant and unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to foreigners and to our own citizens, contracted in a time of imminent peril, for the preservation of our political existence? These remain without any proper or satisfactory provision for their discharge. Have we valuable territories and important posts in the posses- sion of a foreign power, which, by express stipulations, ought long since to have been surrendered ? These are still retained, to the prejudice of our interests not less than of our rights. Are we in a condition to resent or to repel the aggression ? We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor government.* Are we even in a condition to remonstrate with dignity? The just imputations on our own faith, in respect to the same treaty, ought first to be removed. Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free par- ticipation in the navigation of the Mississippi ? Spain excludes us from it. Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of public danger? We seem to have abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable. Is commerce of importance to national wealth? Ours is at the lowest point of declension. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers a safeguard against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our gov- ernment even forbids them to treat with us. Our ambas- sadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is a violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom of national distress? The price of improved land in most parts of the country is much lower than can be ac- counted for by the quantity of waste land at market, and can

* I mean for the Union.

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only be fully explained by that want of private and public con- fidence which is so alarmingly prevalent among all ranks, and which have a direct tendency to depreciate property of every kind. Is private credit the friend and patron of industry? That most useful kind which relates to borrowing and lending is reduced within the narrowest limits, and this still more from an opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity of money. To shorten an enumeration of particulars which can afford neither pleasure nor instruction, it may in general be demanded what indication is there of national disorder, poverty, and insignifi- cance that could befall a community so peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as we are, which does not form a part of the dark catalogue of our public misfortunes ?

This is the melancholy situation, to which we have been brought by those very maxims and councils, which would now deter us from adopting the proposed Constitution ; and which, not content with having conducted us to the brink of a preci- pice, seem resolved to plunge us into the abyss that awaits us below. Here, my countrymen, impelled by every motive that ought to influence an enlightened people, let us make a firm stand for our safety, our tranquillity, our dignity, our reputa- tion. Let us at last break the fatal charm which has too long seduced us from the paths of felicity and prosperity.

It is true, as has been before observed, that facts, too stubborn to be resisted, have produced a species of general assent to the abstract proposition that there exist material defects in our national system ; but the usefulness of the concession, on the part of the old adversaries of federal measures, is destroyed by a strenuous opposition to a remedy, upon the only principles that can give it a chance of success. While they admit that the government of the United States is destitute of energy, they contend against conferring upon it those powers which are req- uisite to supply that energy : They seem still to aim at things repugnant and irreconcilable ; at an augmentation of federal au- thority, without a diminution of State authority ; at sovereignty in the Union, and complete independence in the members. They still, in fine, seem to cherish with blind devotion the political monster of an imperium in imperio. This renders a full display of the principal defects of the confederation necessary, in order to show, that the evils we experience do not proceed from minute

HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY 75

or partial imperfections, but from fundamental errors in the structure of the building, which cannot be amended, otherwise than by an alteration in the first principles and main pillars of the fabric.

The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing confederation is in the principle of legislation for States or governments, in their corporate or collective capacities^ and as contradistinguished from the individuals of which they consist. Though this principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the efficacy of the rest depends. Except as to the rule of apportionment, the United States have an indefinite discre- tion to make requisitions for men and money; but they have no authority to raise either, by regulations extending to the indi- vidual citizens of America. The consequence of this is that, though in theory their resolutions concerning those objects are laws, constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet in practice they are mere recommendations, which the States observe or disregard at their option.

It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the human mind that after all the admonitions we have had from experience on this head, there should still be found men who object to the new Constitution, for deviating from a principle which has been found the bane of the old, and which is, in itself, evidently in- compatible with the idea of government; a principle, in short, which^ if it is to be executed at all, must substitute the violent and sanguinary agency of the sword to the mild influence of the magistracy.

There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or alliance between independent nations for certain de- fined purposes precisely stated in a treaty regulating all the de- tails of time, place, circumstance, and quantity, leaving nothing to future discretion, and depending for its execution on the good faith of the parties. Compacts of this kind exist among all civ- ilized nations, subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace and war, of observance and non-observance, as the interests or passions of the contracting powers dictate. In the early part of the present century there was an epidemical rage in Europe for this species of compacts; from which the politicians of the times fondly hoped for benefits which were never realized. With a

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view to establishing the equihbrium of power and the peace of that part of the world, all the resources of negotiation were ex- hausted, and triple and quadruple alliances were formed; but they were scarcely formed before they were broken, giving an instructive but afflicting lesson to mankind, how little depend- ence is to be placed on treaties which have no other sanction than the obligations of good faith; and which oppose general considerations of peace and justice to the impulse of any im- mediate interest or passion.

If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand in a similar relation to each other, and to drop the pro- ject of a general discretionary superintendence, the scheme would indeed be pernicious, and would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been enumerated under the first head ; but it would have the merit of being, at least, consistent and practic- able. Abandoning all views toward a confederate government, this would bring us to a simple alliance offensive and defensive, and would place us in a situation to be alternately friends and enemies of each other, as our mutual jealousies and rivalships, nourished by the intrigues of foreign nations, should prescribe to us.

But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation ; if we still adhere to the design of a national government, or, which is the same thing, of a superintending power, under the direction of a common council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients which may be considered as forming the characteristic difference between a league and a government ; we must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens — the only proper objects of government.

Government implies the power of making laws. It is essen- tial to the idea of a law that it be attended with a sanction, or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation. This penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways — by the agency of the courts and ministers of justice or by military force; by the coercion of the magistracy or by the coercion of arms. The first kind can evidently apply only to men ; the last kind must, of necessity, be employed against bodies politic

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or communities or States. It is evident that there is no pro- cess of a court by which the observance of the laws can, in the last resort, be enforced. Sentences may be denounced against them for violations of their duty; but these sentences can only be carried into execution by the sword. In an as- sociation where the general authority is confined to the col- lective bodies of the communities that compose it, every breach of the laws must involve a state of war ; and military execution must become the only instrument of civil obedience. Such a state of things can certainly not deserve the name of govern- ment, nor would any prudent man choose to commit his happi- ness to it.

There was a time when we were told that breaches, by the States, of the regulations of the federal authority were not to be expected ; that a sense of common interest would preside over the conduct of the respective members, and would beget a full compliance with all the constitutional requisitions of the Union. This language, at the present day, would appear as wild as a great part of what we now hear from the same quarter will be thought, when we shall have received further lessons from that best oracle of wisdom, experience. It at all times betrayed an ignorance of the true springs by which human conduct is actu- ated, and belied the original inducements to the establishment of civil power. Why has government been instituted at all? Because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint. Has it been found that bodies of men act with more rectitude or greater disinterested- ness than individuals? The contrary of this has been inferred by all accurate observers of the conduct of mankind; and the inference is founded upon obvious reasons. Regard to reputa- tion has a less active influence, when the infamy of a bad action is to be divided among a number, than when it is to fall singly upon one. A spirit of faction, which is apt to mingle its poison in the deliberations of all bodies of men, will often hurry the persons of whom they are composed into improprieties and ex- cesses, for which they would blush in a private capacity.

In addition to all this, there is in the nature of sovereign power an impatience of control that disposes those who are invested with the exercise of it to look with an evil eye upon all external attempts to restrain or direct its operations. From this spirit

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it happens that in every political association which is formed upon the principle of uniting in a common interest a number of lesser sovereignties, there will be found a kind of eccentric ten- dency in the subordinate or inferior orbs, by the operation of which there will be a perpetual effort in each to fly off from the common centre. This tendency is not difficult to be accounted for. It has its origin in the love of power. Power controlled or abridged is almost always the rival and enemy of that power by which it is controlled or abridged. This simple proposition will teach us how little reason there is to expect that the persons intrusted with the administration of the affairs of the particular members of a confederacy will at all times be ready, with perfect good-humor, and an unbiassed regard to the public weal, to exe- cute the resolutions or decrees of the general authority. The reverse of this results from the constitution of human nature. If, therefore, the measures of the confederacy cannot be exe- cuted without the intervention of the particular administrations, there will be little prospect of their being executed at all. The rulers of the respective members, whether they have a consti- tutional right to do it or not, will undertake to judge of the pro- priety of the measures, themselves. They will consider the con- formity of the thing proposed or required to their immediate interests or aims; the momentary conveniences or inconven- iences that would attend its adoption. All this will be done, and in a spirit of interested and suspicious scrutiny, without that knowledge of national circumstances and reasons of state which is essential to a right judgment, and with that strong predilec- tion in favor of local objects which can hardly fail to mislead the decision. The same process must be repeated in every member of which the body is constituted ; and the execution of the plans, framed by the councils of the whole, will always fluctuate on the discretion of the ill-informed and prejudiced opinion of every part. Those who have been conversant in the proceedings of popular assemblies ; who have seen how diflicult it often is, when there is no exterior pressure of circumstances, to bring them to harmonious resolutions on important points, will readily con- ceive how impossible it must be to induce a number of such assemblies, deliberating at a distance from each other, at differ- ent times, and under different impressions, long to co-operate in the same views and pursuits.

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In our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign wills is requisite, under the confederation, to the complete exe- cution of every important measure that proceeds from the Union. It has happened as was to have been foreseen. The measures of the Union have not been executed; the delinquen- cies of the States have, step by step, matured themselves to an extreme which has at length arrested all the wheels of the na- tional government and brought them to an awful stand. Con- gress at this time scarcely possess the means of keeping up the forms of administration, till the States can have time to agree upon a more substantial substitute for the present shadow of a federal government. Things did not come to this desperate extremity at once. The causes which have been specified pro- duced at first only unequal and disproportionate degrees of compliance with the requisitions of the Union. The greater deficiencies of some States furnished the pretext of example and the temptation of interest to the complying or to the least delinquent States. Why should we do more in proportion than those who are embarked with us in the same political voyage? Why should we consent to bear more than our proper share of the common burden? These were suggestions which human selfishness could not withstand, and which even speculative men, who looked forward to remote consequences, could not, without hesitation, combat. Each State, yielding to the per- suasive voice of immediate interest or convenience, has suc- cessively withdrawn its support, till the frail and tottering edifice seems ready to fall upon our heads, and to crush us be- neath its ruins. Publius.

8o THE FEDERALIST

No. XVI

IN RESPECT TO LEGISLATION FOR STATES COLLECTIVELY

THE tendency of the principle of legislation for States or communities in their political capacities, as it has been exemplified by the experiment we have made of it, is equally attested by the events which have befallen all other governments of the confederate kind of which we have any account, in exact proportion to its prevalence in those systems. The confirmations of this fact will be worthy of a distinct and particular examination. I shall content myself with barely ob- serving here that of all the confederacies of antiquity which history has handed down to us, the Lycian and Achaean leagues, as far as there remain vestiges of them, appear to have been most free from the fetters of that mistaken principle, and were accordingly those which have best deserved, and have most liberally received, the applauding suffrages of political writers.

This exceptionable principle may, as truly as emphatically, be styled the parent of anarchy. It has been seen that delin- quencies in the members of the Union are its natural and neces- sary offspring; and that whenever they happen, the only con- stitutional remedy is force, and the immediate effect of the use of it, civil war.

It remains to inquire how far so odious an engine of gov- ernment, in its application to us, would even be capable of an- swering its end. If there should not be a large army, con- stantly at the disposal of the national government, it would either not be able to employ force at all, or, when this could be done, it would amount to a war between parts of the confed- eracy, concerning the infractions of a league; in which the strongest combination would be most likely to prevail, whether it consisted of those who supported or of those who resisted the general authority. It would rarely happen that the de- linquency to be redressed would be confined to a single mem- ber; and if there were more than one who had neglected his duty, similarity of situation would induce them to unite for common defence. Independent of this motive of sympathy, if

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a large and influential State should happen to be the aggressing member, it would commonly have weight enough with its neighbors to win over some of them as associates to its cause. Specious arguments of danger to the common liberty could easily be contrived; plausible excuses for the deficiencies of the party could, without difficulty, be invented, to alarm the appre- hensions, inflame the passions, and conciliate the good-will even of those States which were not chargeable with any violation or omission of duty. This would be the more likely to take place, as the delinquencies of the larger members might be ex- pected sometimes to proceed from an ambitious premeditation in their rulers, with a view to getting rid of all external control upon their designs of personal aggrandizement; the better to effect which, it is presumable they would tamper beforehand with leading individuals in the adjacent States. If associates could not be found at home, recourse would be had to the aid of foreign powers, who would seldom be disinclined to encour- aging the dissensions of a confederacy, from the firm Union of which they had so much to fear. When the sword is once drawn, the passions of men observe no bounds of moderation. The suggestions of wounded pride, the instigations of irritated resentment, would be apt to carry the States, against which the arms of the Union were exerted, to any extremes necessary to avenge the afifront or to avoid the disgrace of submission. The first war of this kind would probably terminate in a dissolution of the Union.

This may be considered as the violent death of the confed- eracy. Its more natural death is what we now seem to be on the point of experiencing, if the federal system be not speedily renovated in a more substantial form. It is not probable, consid- ering the genius of this country, that the complying States would often be inclined to support the authority of the Union, by engaging in a war against the non-complying States. They would always be more ready to pursue the milder course of putting themselves upon an equal footing with the delinquent members, by an imitation of their example. And the guilt of all would thus become the security of all. Our past experience has exhibited the operation of this spirit in its full light. There would in fact be an insuperable difficulty in ascertaining when force could with propriety be employed. In the article of pe- 6

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cuniary contribution, which would be the most usual source of delinquency, it would often be impossible to decide whether it had proceeded from disinclination or inability. The pretence of the latter would always be at hand. And the case must be very flagrant in which its fallacy could be detected with suffi- cient certainty to justify the harsh expedient of compulsion. It is easy to see that this problem alone, as often as it should occur, would open a wide field for the exercise of factious views, of partiality, and of oppression, in the majority that happened to prevail in the national council.

It seems to require no pains to prove that the States ought not to prefer a national constitution which could only be kept in motion by the instrumentality of a large army continually on foot to execute the ordinary requisitions or decrees of the government. And yet this is the plain alternative involved by those who wish to deny it the power of extending its operations to individuals. Such a scheme, if practicable at all, would in- stantly degenerate into a military despotism; but it will be found in every light impracticable. The resources of the Union would not be equal to the maintenance of an army considerable enough to confine the larger States within the limits of their duty; nor would the means ever be furnished of forming such an army in the first instance. Whoever considers the popu- lousness and strength of several of these States singly at the present juncture, and looks forward to what they will become, even at the distance of half a century, will at once dismiss as idle and visionary any scheme which aims at regulating their movements by laws, to operate upon them in their collective capacities, and to be executed by a coercion applicable to them in the same capacities. A project of this kind is little less romantic than the monster-taming spirit, which is attributed to the fabulous heroes and demi-gods of antiquity.

Even in those confederacies which have been composed of members smaller than many of our counties, the principle of legislation for sovereign States, supported by military coercion, has never been found effectual. It has rarely been attempted to be employed but against the weaker members; and in most instances attempts to coerce the refractory and disobedient have been the signals of bloody wars, in which one-half of the con- federacy has displayed its banners against the other half.

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The result of these observations to an intelHgent mind must be clearly this, that if it be possible at any rate to construct a federal government capable of regulating the common concerns and preserving the general tranquillity, it must be founded, as to the objects committed to its care, upon the reverse of the principle contended for by the opponents of the proposed Con- stitution. It must carry its agency to the persons of the citi- zens. It must stand in need of no intermediate legislation, but must itself be empowered to employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions. The majesty of the national authority must be manifested through the medium of the courts of justice. The government of the Union, like that of each State, must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals, and to attract to its support those passions which have